

The Recycling of Geopolitical Ideas and the Affirmation of Old World Order Theories

An analysis of Samuel P. Huntington's theory "The Clash of Civilizations"

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The most formidable difficulty facing a scientific inquiry into the nature and ways of international politics is the ambiguity of the material with which the observer has to deal...The first lesson the student of international politics must learn and never forget is that the complexities of international affairs make simple solutions and trustworthy prophecies impossible. It is here that the scholar and the charlatan part company...In every political situation contradictory tendencies are at play...which tendency actually will prevail is anybody's guess. The best the scholar can do, then, is to trace the different tendencies which, as potentialities, are inherent in a certain international situation.

(Hans Morgenthau, 1948)

Part 1: Introduction

Since the Cold War came to an end with the fall of the Soviet Empire, academics and politicians have been trying to make sense of the new world situation. Several different world order theories, some more plausible than others, were presented, trying to explain the new structure and guiding principles of the post-Cold War world. There was one theory, however, which stood out amongst the others, and that was the one by Harvard-professor Samuel P. Huntington, called 'the clash of civilizations'. It provoked many by claiming that "In this new world, local politics is the politics of ethnicity; global politics is the politics of civilizations. The rivalry of the superpowers is replaced by the clash of civilizations."(Huntington, 1996, p. 28).

Huntington's theory created an intense and broad debate all around the world, as it seemed to create a new enemy as a substitute for communism, especially after '9/11'. Now, eleven years after Huntington first presented his theory, the question, whether or not civilizations clash, is still being debated.

Critics from the academic field largely disagree with Huntington and conclude that his theory should be dismissed. However, most of the criticisms do not question the basis or premises his arguments and theory rests on. Therefore, these criticisms seem to 'unintentionally' operate within the conceptual world order Huntington has created.

To a student of the history of ideas, the question whether civilizations clash or not, is not the main focus. Huntington's theory is rather relevant in terms of how it represents a part of our western conceptual history. In other words, what is important to examine is the conceptual framework of Huntington's theory.

By analysing Huntington's theory, not just textually, but also within a historical context and a contemporary political context, it is possible to deconstruct the theory and uncover the underlying ideas and concepts that make up his theory. The result is a different perspective of his theory, which in turn affects the questions being asked. In what way is Huntington's theory representative of a western geopolitical theory? Is his theory perhaps just a rephrase of the

traditional western geopolitical maps with the enemy assigned new nametags? Does the theory stem from another motiv than to explain the new world order? Could it be that a 'civilizational' world order map in our post-Cold War serves a political purpose? Is the theory really about the clash of civilizations?

I believe it is significant to reexamine his theory because, regardless of all the criticism it has recieved, Huntington's theory has had an enormous impact not only in the West, but throughout the world. His theory is interesting because it has contributed to returning concepts such as religion, culture, and civilizations 'back' into the leading political discourse. In other words, it is well tuned to our present western mental conceptual framework. Therefore, it would be fruitful not just to argue with Huntington within his own text, but to move outside the text and ask how and why he has constructed this theory because when viewed from this perspective the theory tells us more about 'us' than it does about a coming clash of civilizations.

My analysis of Huntington's theory is divided into four parts. The first part is a short presentation of Huntington and his theory followed by a brief rundown of the original debate. In this part I also explain the structure of my analysis and the questions I aim to answer. In Part 2 I examine Huntington's theory within a geopolitical historical context in order to uncover the premises of his theory. Part 3 examines why the American identity is relevant in an analysis of Huntington's theory. In the last part I place Huntington's theory within a contemporary political context as this gives weight to my claim that Huntington places new political issues into an old theoretical framework.

1.1 The Author and the Theory

A Brief Overview of Huntington's Professional Background and Previous International Relations Concerns

Samuel P. Huntington has a long and impressive academic record. He received his BA in 1946 at Yale, then moving on to attain his MA in 1948 at the University of Chicago, and finally his PhD at Harvard University. Huntington has a long history with the research institute, Center for International Affairs (CFIA) at Harvard. In 1978-1989 Huntington served as the director of the institute. Today, Huntington is the director of the John Olin Institute of Strategic Studies at Harvard (Dalby, Ó Tuathail and Routledge, 1998, p. 170). Huntington, can be classified as a realist, but many have also labelled him as a neoconservative thinker.

Huntington has not been confined to academic circles, on the contrary, he has worked closely with different US governmental agencies. He has acted as political advisor to Democrats like Hubert Humphrey and Jimmy Carter. He has also been a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Trilateral Commission, and he worked as coordinator of security planning at the National Security Council.

Huntington's close ties to the American foreign policy establishment, therefore makes him not only an academic. No doubt, these factors; the elite circles of the Ivy League academics and the foreign policy establishment, will have had an important impact on his ideas, his foreign policy attitudes and, but not least, his 'clash of civilizations' theory. This aspect will be readily discussed in the last chapter, 4.1 Huntington's Theory versus Huntington's Realism.

In Huntington's earlier works, (*Political Order in Changing Societies*. 1968), he was concerned with questions of governmentality in developing and developed states. At the time, the Soviet Union and the communist ideology, was the biggest challenge facing the US. Huntington's work can be seen as a direct response to this situation. He stresses the importance of organization in establishing a viable political regime. To Huntington, "In the modernizing world he controls the future who organizes its politics" (Dalby, Ó Tuathail and Routledge, 1998, p. 170).

In 1975, Huntington gave out a report on the governability of developed democracies to the Trilateral Commission. In “The Crisis of Democracy”, Huntington analyses the social and political situations of the day. He believes that society suffers from what he calls a general “excess of democracy”. The solution to this growing disrespect for authority, calls for “a greater degree of moderation in democracy”, in other words, a return to the old conservative notions of how society should operate.

Huntington agreed with the containment policy that was directed towards the Soviet Union. He also supported the US military buildup at that time. To the intellectuals of statecraft, the Cold War was understood according to clear classic or conventional strategic discourse. However, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the simplistic world-picture that the Cold War World had provided was gone. “The world changed in 1990”, Huntington remarked, “and so did strategic discourse”. The world became a chaotic place to the intellectuals of statecraft (Dalby, Ó Tuathail and Routledge, 1998, p. 170).

Short Summary of Huntington's Theory

On the 9th of November, 1989, the Berlin Wall came down marking the end of the Cold War era. For some people this signalled the “end of history”¹. Francis Fukuyama proclaimed that the ideological victory of liberal democracy and capitalism in the West over Communism in the East, essentially meant that there would be no longer any significant reasons for global conflict because eventually western liberal democratic ideals would be spread all around the world. For Huntington however, the end of the Cold War marked the beginning of an uncertain time and it certainly was not the end of History! This new world "is likely to lack the clarity and stability of the Cold War and to be a more jungle-like world of multiple dangers, hidden traps, unpleasant surprises and moral ambiguities" (Huntington, 1993, p. 76) Huntington noted.

In order to better understand and maybe even predict future events in this new world, he felt that a new paradigm for viewing global politics was needed. Huntington first published his interpretation of the evolution of world politics after the Cold War in 1993 an article in the Journal of Foreign Affairs, titled *The Clash of Civilizations?* (Huntington, 1993a) This evoked

¹ The term is taken from the title of Fukuyama's book; *The End of History and the Last Man*.

an enormous response world-wide. According to the editor of Foreign Affairs, it stirred up more discussion than any other article they had published since the 1940's (Huntington, 1996). Three years later he elaborated on his ideas in his book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. He presents here a new paradigm, as a more meaningful and useful instrument for viewing global politics (Huntington, 1996).

Huntington states that civilizational and cultural factors, not economics or ideologies will be the principle reason why conflicts occur in our Post Cold War world. While he believes that nation states will still continue to be the most powerful actors in world affairs, future conflicts will essentially revolve around nations or groups of peoples with different civilizational background. In other words: "The rivalry of the superpowers is replaced by the clash of civilizations" (Huntington, 1996, p. 28).

In our Post Cold War world, international politics is moving out of its "Western phase" (Huntington, 1993a , p. 23), meaning that the West will no longer be the dominant civilization. Non-Western civilizations will take their place alongside the West, equally influencing international politics. "...non-Western civilizations no longer remain the objects of history as targets of Western colonialism but join the West as movers and shapers of history." (Huntington, 1993a, p. 23).

In this Multicivilizational world that Huntington describes, he has identified eight major civilizational groupings: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and 'possibly' African.

In this 'new' multicivilizational world, conflicts will arise because cultural identities are becoming more and more important in our globalized world. Unlike many globalizational optimists, Huntington does not believe that increased interaction between cultures will bring about greater understanding between the different cultures. On the contrary, Huntington believes that differences will be highlighted which in turn will be a new source of global conflict.

Huntington sees the differences between civilizations not only as real, but also as deeply rooted in many thousand years of history. This has resulted in fundamental cultural differences that cannot easily be disregarded or erased. These civilizational characteristics are

also more fundamental than the differences between political ideologies or political regimes. According to Huntington, "...culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the pattern of cohesion, disintegration and conflict in the Post Cold War world." (Huntington, 1996, p. 20).

In our new civilizational world order therefore, countries sharing the same culture will have a much greater tendency than before to rally behind each other in international conflicts.

The main catalysts of cultural conflicts in the future will most likely be due to 'Asian affirmation', 'Islamic resurgence' and 'Western Universalism'. By 'Asian affirmation', Huntington is referring to East Asian economic growth. This growth is altering the balance of power between Asia and the West and "...will have deeply destabilizing effects on the Western-dominated established international order" (Huntington, 1996, p. 121), 'Islamic resurgence' on the other hand is due to social mobilization and population growth. This will have a highly destabilizing impact on global politics, because "Population growth in Muslim countries, and particular the expansion of the fifteen-to-twenty four year old age cohort, provides recruits for fundamentalism, terrorism, insurgency, and migration" (Huntington, 1996, p. 103), 'Western Universalism' he finds to be extremely dangerous to the stability of the world because "What is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest." (Huntington, 1996, p. 184).

The central axis of world politics, therefore, is likely to be the conflict between "the West and the rest" (Huntington, 1996), caused mainly by the non-western civilizations responses to western power and values.

In order to avoid a 'clash of civilizations' in the future, Huntington believes it is important that the West no longer regards itself as a universal civilization, but as a unique civilization placed alongside all the other civilizations. If the West is to survive in this new civilizational world order, Americans need to reaffirm their Western identity and except that their civilization is unique, not universal. This is vital in order to be able to preserve their culture against challenges from non-Western societies. In the end then, "Avoidence of a global war of civilizations depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multicivilizational character of global politics." (Huntington, 1996, p. 21).

1.2 The Original Debate

When Huntington's article, "The Clash of Civilizations?" first appeared in *Foreign Affairs* in the summer of 1993, it "stirred up more discussion in three years than any other article they had published since the 1940's." (Huntington, 1996, p. 13). Responses to his article came from all over the world, from all different civilizations. The debate could be followed in all the major newspapers around the world. The responses themselves varied, some agreeing, some partially agreeing and some disagreeing completely. Huntington's thesis did not go unnoticed by leading politicians around the world. Dr. Abd Elaziz M. Hegazy, former Prime Minister of Egypt, thanked Huntington for a thought-provoking article, and former President Richard Nixon, wrote to say he would be among the first to purchase the book (Cooper and Maier, 1994). As Huntington himself states: "Whatever else it did, the article struck a nerve in people of every civilization." (Huntington, 1996, p. 13).

After having presented his theory in *Foreign Affairs* in the summer of 1993, the responses to Huntington's theory could be read just a few months later in the September/October volume of the *Foreign Affairs*.

It is relevant to convey the jest of the original debate conducted in *Foreign Affairs* because, not only does the initial debate reflect the most common way in which his theory has been perceived and criticized but it also helps to distinguish my approach/analysis to the theory.

In the original debate, Fouad Ajami² in his article "The Summoning", criticises Huntington's definition of civilizations. "Huntington has found his civilizations whole and intact, watertight under an eternal sky." (Ajami, 1993). To Ajami, civilizations have always been "messy creatures" which are susceptible to the effects of history. Huntington, Ajami says, ignores the cultural overlapping in the world. "The crooked and meandering alleyways of the world are straightened out. With a sharp pencil and a steady hand Huntington marks out where one civilization ends and the wilderness of "the other" begins." (Ajami, 1993).

² Fouad Ajami is Majid Khadduri Professor of Middle Eastern Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies, The John Hopkins University.

Ajami, also reacts to Huntington's placement of the "state" in the global political scene. Even though Huntington proclaims that "Nation states are and will remain the most important actors in world affairs" (Huntington, 1996, p. 36), Ajami, interprets this as only an obligatory statement. He is amazed that Huntington, "one of the most influential and brilliant students of the state and its national interests" (Ajami, 1993), can down play the "slyness of states". The impression one is left with after reading Huntington's theory is that states are written off and in its place one can find clashing civilizations.

Ajami goes on to criticise Huntington's perspective on the state of the West. Huntington believes that Western power is declining and at the same time he is seeing a resurgence of the other non-western civilizations. Where Huntington sees "de-Westernization" in non-western countries, it is explained by what he calls "Hinduization" of India and Islamic fundamentalism in the Muslim part of the world. Ajami, taking a complete opposite perspective than Huntington, places his belief in the power of modernity. According to Ajami, Huntington has "underestimated the tenacity of modernity and secularism..." (Ajami, 1993) on the non-western cultures. Ajami uses India to illustrate his point. India, he says, will not become a Hindu state because the inheritance of Indian secularism will hold. "The vast middle class will defend it, keep the order intact to maintain India's-and it's own-place in the modern world of nations." (Ajami, 1993). Ajami does not deny that voices of religious fanaticism can be heard, but the Indian bourgeoisie is not about to let the state turn into a political kingdom of Hindu purity.

When it comes to Huntington's notion of the "kin-country syndrome", Ajami again stressing the importance of the role of the state, says "that states will consort with any civilization, however alien, as long as the price is right and the goods are ready." (Ajami, 1993).

Ajami does not deny the importance of cultural/civilizational factors when understanding the politics of the world, however it is vital to know that "civilizations do not control states, states control civilizations." (Ajami, 1993).

Ajami ends his critique of Huntington's thesis by saying that we remain in a world of self-help. States stand alone, it would be nice to believe that one could count on kin-countries in times of trouble, but as long as history has been recorded, states give their help when it is in their interest to do so. He ends with an example from history:

The lessons bequeathed us by Thucydides in his celebrated dialogue between the Melians and the Athenians remains. The Melians, it will be recalled, were a colony of the Lacedaemonians. Besieged by Athens, they held out and were sure that the Lacedaemonians were “bound, if only for very shame, to come to aid of their kindred.” The Melians never wavered in their confidence in their “civilizational” allies: “Our common blood insures our fidelity.” We know what became of the Melians. Their allies did not turn up, their island was sacked, their world laid to waste (Ajami, 1993).

As a follow up, Huntington gives his response a couple of months later in *Foreign Affairs*. “If not civilizations, what?” (Huntington, 1993b) Huntington replies. He does not see that any of the replies that were given to his theory, could provide a better alternative theory for understanding the global political world. Fouad Ajami’s statist paradigm, Huntington refers to as an “pseudo-alternative”. By “pseudo-alternative”, Huntington means that Ajami has constructed “a totally irrelevant and artificial opposition between states and civilizations” (Huntington, 1993b). When Ajami, states that “Civilizations do not control states,” but rather “states control Civilizations”, Huntington believes that it is meaningless to talk about states and civilizations in terms of “control”. Yes, states do try to balance power, but if that is all they did, “West European countries would have coalesced with the Soviet Union against the United States in the late 1940’s” (Huntington, 1993b), says Huntington.

Ajami’s criticism, that Huntington has written off the nation state, when understanding the international political scene, is not accepted by Huntington. He repeats himself, “Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs” (Huntington, 1993b), they are however becoming more civilizational focused. During the Cold War, nation states were generally classified as belonging to one of the three worlds (the First, Second and Third), but Huntington says, they also belonged to civilizations. Now, after the end of the Cold War, the “West European peoples and states now see a cultural threat from the South replacing the ideological threat from the East.” (Huntington, 1993b).

Huntington interprets Ajami's concept of the "solitude of states", as connections between states not existing. It can of course be discussed if Huntington here has decided to overlook Ajami's meaning, because Huntington goes on to say that civilizational factors such as history, culture, religion, language, location and institution, will effect the way a state acts. "To deny their existence is to deny the basic realities of human existence." (Huntington, 1993b).

When it comes to "de-westernization" and rising fundamentalism in non-western countries, they give opposite interpretations of the facts. While Ajami, using India as an example, finds that fundamentalism will not win because of the powerful effect of modernity, Huntington is not so sure that western modernity can break the rising tide of fundamentalism. As support to his claim, Huntington, refers to an article written in the *New York Times* (September 23, 1993). It describes an India where Hindu fundamentalism is gradually growing, and especially towards India's Muslim minority. The article also points out, contrary to what Ajami believes, that India may retain a secular façade, but that in reality the middle class is gradually adopting the views of the Hindu fundamentalists.

In effect the discussion centres around Huntington's classifications and descriptions of the various cultures and how 'civilizational' factors play a part in our new international political environment.

The arguments that the initial debate is framed on more or less represents the proceeding discussions that have followed these last ten years. To my mind, these approaches are relevant criticisms but they are also limited in so far as they 'unintentionally' have operated within the civilizational conceptual framework that Huntington has 'created' with his theory and in this way have indirectly given support to his theory.

A typical example of this is Simon Murden's analysis of Huntington's theory. Murden criticises Huntington's definitions: "Where Huntington could really be criticized, though, was in his downplaying of the power of global economics and its culture." (Baylis and Smith, 2001, p. 462). Here Murden does not question Huntington's structural mapping of global space along civilizational/cultural lines. Instead he believes that economics should occupy a greater part on this cognitive map over how global politics works. Murden goes on to say that "Huntington failed to recognize the extent to which traditional cultures are moderated and

synthesized by global society and markets, and how the belligerency of even the keenest of civilizational warriors is usually tempered by the imperatives of globalized life." (Baylis and Smith, 2001, p. 462). Murden believes that even though Huntington's theory has its weaknesses, it rightly does point in the direction of the emerging patterns of international politics and cooperation of the future.

In the end Murden's analysis like most other analysis, has operated within the geo-civilizational map Huntington has drawn up. Even though they question Huntington's understanding of how various cultures react and how their development is effected by the influence of modernity are relevant and interesting, their criticism can only take us so far. The weakness of this type of analysis is that it implicitly supports Huntington's 'civilizational' world order because it does not question Huntington's civilizational world order map in it self.

1.3 Questions and structure of the analysis

In contrast to the Original debate and most other criticisms of Huntington's theory, where the discussion occurs within the civilizational world order, my aim is to question the conceptual construction of his theory. In other words, for instance, my aim has not been to analyze whether Huntington's description of the Muslim civilization is correct or not, but rather try to uncover why and how he has constructed this controversial new world order paradigm.

My analysis is divided into three main parts: Part 2 Huntington's Theory and Geopolitical History, Part 3 Huntington's Theory and the American Identity, Part 4 Huntington's Theory and His Theoretical Realsim.

Part 2: Huntington's Theory and Geopolitical History:

In the preface of his book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Huntington says that his theory "...aspires to present a framework, a paradigm, for viewing global politics that will be meaningful to scholars and useful to policymakers." (Huntington, 1996, pp. 13-14). That his theory represents a paradigm within the field of international relations is a bold claim to make, even for a Harvard professor. This claim guides my analysis in part 2. In other words, is it viable of Huntington to claim that his theory represents a new paradigm within the field of international relations?

In order to shed light on this question it is necessary to uncover the theoretical and conceptual construction of Huntington's civilizational world order theory. Using geopolitical theory³ as a backdrop it has been possible to deconstruct his theory. With the help of primary older geopolitical texts and secondary literature, I have been able to examine whether his theory is based upon and operates within the same 'modern' conceptual constructions as his predecessors. In other words, I have examined whether older themes, concepts, and ideas from older discourses have been worked into the theory's discursive space, despite differences in material and historical conditions.

Therefore, apart from shedding light on whether Huntington's theory can be regarded as a paradigm or not, part 2 also places Huntington's theory within western geopolitical history.

³ Huntington's theory is classified as a geopolitical theory.

For practical reasons, I have narrowed the large canvas of geopolitics down to three different concepts. Each of the concepts representing the three principle building blocks in a geopolitical text, namely geography (Visualizing Global Space), politics (The 'Other' in Geopolitics), and time (Fin-De-Siècle). These three concepts make up the three chapters in part 2.

The first chapter 2.2, 'Visualizing Global Space', examines how 'global space' was understood in western geopolitical history and how Huntington's theory is part of this tradition. In other words, can Huntington's theory be regarded as an objective world-view? In the following chapter, chapter 2.3 'The 'Other' in Geopolitics' examines how the concept of the 'Other' is a vital element in a geopolitical theory and how Huntington's 'Other' works within his theory. In the last chapter 2.4 'Fin-De-Siècle', asks the question whether the phenomenon 'ending of a century' has had an impact on Huntington's theory.

Part 3: Huntington's Theory and the American Identity

A central theme in Huntington's theory is the 'decline of the West' and his preoccupation with the future of the American identity, which he sees as threatened. Huntington states: "The futures of the United States and the West depend upon Americans reaffirming their commitment to Western civilization." (Huntington, 1996, p. 307). The question is, does the concept of the American identity play a significant role in the construction of his world order paradigm? Is it possible that his theory can tell us more about the domestic political situation in the United States than it does about a coming clash of civilizations? In order to shed light on these questions, I have divided this section into two distinct chapters. The first chapter examines Huntington's theory within its contemporary context and asked whether our postmodern globalized world has had an impact on how Huntington has designed his theory. In the second chapter I examine how the shaping of the American identity, through history, is tied to American foreign policy.

Part 4: Huntington's Theory and His Theoretical Realism

The last section is an analysis of a contradiction that became especially evident after 11th of September 2001. In an interview just a few months after 9/11, Huntington blatantly claims that those horrible acts of terror could not be classified as a real clash of civilizations! (Achenbach, 2001). Bearing in mind that Huntington has predicted a 'clash of civilizations', why didn't he use those attacks as a confirmation of his thesis?

In the interviews and the articles by Huntington that followed, this claim was upheld. There is a significant contradiction between Huntington's positions in *The Clash of Civilizations* and his explanations following 9/11. In a *Newsweek* article published after 9/11, he states;

"...the age of Muslim wars has its roots in more general causes. These do not include the inherent nature of Islamic doctrine and beliefs, which, like those of Christianity, adherents can use to justify peace or war as they wish. The causes of contemporary Muslim wars lie in politics, not seventh-century religious doctrines." (Huntington, 2002).

This statement can almost qualify as a negation to his views expressed in *The Clash of Civilizations*, where he gives historical cultural/religious reasons, not political, for why Muslims resort to violence more often than non-Muslims. Muslim states tend to use violence to solve problems more than others because "...Islam has from the start been a religion of the sword and that it glorifies military virtues". He explains that, "The Koran and other statements of Muslim beliefs contain few prohibitions on violence, and a concept of non-violence is absent from Muslim doctrine and practice." (Huntington, 1996).

This obvious contradiction between Huntington's statements from his 'Clash theory' and his later articles or interviews, is an interesting aspect, when examined helps to uncover a different perspective to Huntington's theory. Should Huntington's theory be understood as a political piece of work rather than an academic theory? Part 4, therefore, focuses on Huntington's theoretical background in relation to his theory. It also brings together the different conclusions from the previous chapters, which together supports my main claim.

Part 2: Huntington's Theory and Geopolitical history

2.1 Geopolitics

As mentioned in the introduction, this section is an analysis of Huntington's theory within the context of a geopolitical historical perspective. Before moving on to the discussion, however, a definition and a short introduction to the concept of 'geopolitics' is necessary.

'Geopolitics' as an academic discipline is not easily defined. As with other academic subjects, it is a product of its times and its definition has continued to evolve with the changing historical conditions. Therefore, in order to achieve a better understanding of what 'geopolitics' implies, it is best to draw up, briefly, its historical and discursive context of its use.

Starting with the term itself, 'geopolitics', has Greek roots. "*Ge* or *Gaia*, is derived from the goddess of the earth, and *polis*, meaning the city-state of classical Greece. *Ge* represented humankind's terrestrial home in all its variety and abundance, while the *polis* was the control and organization of it by humankind." (Parker, 1998, p. 10).

The term, 'geopolitics' was first coined in 1899, by a Swedish political scientist named Rudolf Kjellén (1864-1922). According to Kjellén, 'geopolitics' is "...the theory of the state as a geographical organism or phenomenon in space." (Kjellén, 1916). Even though it was Kjellén who first coined the term, it was the ideas of the German geographer, Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904), that provided the guiding principles of this new 'science'. Ratzel, who was a Professor of Geography, first at the University of Munich and then at Leipzig, was particularly interested in the political aspects of human behavior. He viewed the state as an organism fixed in the soil, whose spirit derived from mankind's ties to the land. He identified *Raum* (space) and *Lage* (position) as the two principle determinants of the fortunes of states. Depending on the different geographical conditions, each state has its own particular needs. Ratzel was also the one who introduced the idea of *Lebensraum* (living space). The concept of *Lebensraum* focused on the state's need to have enough territory in order to prosper and survive. Ratzel's 'organic' theory of state was in keeping with social Darwinism at the time.

In the late nineteenth century the application of the geographical method to the understanding and explaining of political and international questions was quite new, but it soon became a popular perspective, guiding politicians in their decision-making and actions. Geopolitics became an integral part of the western imperial knowledge that dealt with the relationship between the physical earth and politics, and was also quickly established as a service to the state.

It was the British geographer Halford Mackinder (1861-1947), however, who provided the first coherent description of the world as a functioning geopolitical entity. For him the planet was a closed system, where change in one part of the system would change the balance of relationships in all other parts. His main work, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, was printed at the end of the First World War as a warning to the Western peacemakers at Versailles against a peace that might lead to a combination of German and Russian power.

Mackinder developed his world strategic views at a crucial moment when Britain was losing its political and economic leadership. Just as his predecessors, Mackinder also saw geographical realities as essential determinants for a states survival. Some land areas, because of their geographical qualities and location, were more important and central than others. Mackinder labelled the inner area of Eurasia as the 'pivot area' of world politics, meaning that who ever ruled this central area, 'the Heartland', could easily rule the world. His now famous dictum reads:

Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the world (Mackinder, 1919).

It is important to point out, that Mackinder's 'Heartland' theory remains probably the most well known geopolitical model throughout the world. It has had an enormous influence, not only on later geopolitical theories and ideas, but also within other disciplines. A more detailed description of his theory will be given in chapter 2.2: Visualizing Global Space.

In the 1920's, the geopolitical forum shifted to Germany. As a result of Germany's defeat in the First World War and with the harsh terms of the Versailles treaty, German *Geopolitik* emerged as a framework for strategic thinking. The subject thus acquired a negative image in the West. Both Ratzel and Mackinder's ideas were worked into this new *geopolitik*.

Following Germany's defeat in the First World War, Ratzel's ideas had been taken up by a group of German geographers who proceeded to use them as the basis for a systematic plan not only for the recovery of Germany but for the country's return to great power status. Their underlying contention was that while political geography was concerned with its spatial conditions of the state, geopolitics was concerned with its spatial requirements. The whole Nazi strategy for German domination in Europe was influenced by the ideas formulated by these geopoliticians (Parker, 1994, p. 171).

After the Second World War, because of its close association to the Nazi regime and its aggressive foreign policy, geopolitics was ignored and disregarded in academic circles. In the later years of the Cold War, however, the term resurfaced. Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger helped to revive it by using it as a synonym for the superpower game of balance-of-power politics (Dalby, Ó Tuathail and Routledge, 1998, p. 1). Cold War classical doctrines such as 'containment' and the 'domino theory' are all inspired by older geopolitical ideas. The most significant inheritance from older geopolitical ideas, comes from Mackinder. With his 'Heartland' theory, Mackinder provided a special world view that suited the needs of the US foreign policy makers after 1945. The Heartland theory provided an easy way of understanding the new dualistic world order of the Cold War. Mackinder's threatening 'Other', Germany, was replaced by the new threatening 'Other', the USSR. In other words, it was vital to prevent the USSR from containing and controlling the World-Island.

The end of the Cold War, according to the view of 'critical' geopolitics, created a vacuum. It "...was experienced as a condition of geopolitical vertigo, a state of confusion where the old nostrums of the Cold War were redundant and new ones had not yet been invented, issued and approved." (Dalby, Ó Tuathail and Routledge, 1998, p. 103).

As we shall see, it is this geopolitical 'state of vertigo' that Huntington, amongst others, tries to do something about. The 'Clash of Civilizations Theory', is Huntington's contribution, in the effort to reorder the world after the Cold War.

Huntington's theory can easily be classified as a geopolitical piece of work. It is therefore highly relevant to examine his theory in relation to other geopolitical texts. I will therefore trace concepts and principles that are central to geopolitical theories and examine how they are relevant to Huntington's theory. In other words, I would like, with the help of geopolitical

history, to shed light on the conceptual construction of his theory and show that Huntington's geopolitical theory is based on many of the same principles as older geopolitical texts, despite the obvious difference in historical time and space.

2.2 Visualizing Global Space

Huntington's theory, as a geopolitical theory, has presented the world with presumably a new all encompassing worldview of the post-Cold War era. The aim of this chapter and the following chapters in this section is not only to place Huntington's theory within western geopolitical history, but also to deconstruct his theory in order to uncover and shed light on certain significant aspects of his theory that will help to answer how and why he has constructed this theory.

In this chapter, specifically, I will examine the historical development of one of the central premises for geopolitical texts, namely 'visualizing of global space', the aim is to show that Huntington's theory is part of a western geopolitical tradition of portraying a subjective political worldview in the guise of an objective 'scientific' structure. By examining this tradition of global geographical visualization, it is significant not only to place Huntington's theory in a larger historical perspective, but also to shed light on the question whether Huntington's theory can be classified as a new paradigm within international relations?

Before I begin the analysis, it is necessary to discuss the paradigm concept. Huntington, even referring to Thomas Kuhn, gives a short and to my mind inadequate explanation of what a paradigm entails. His description could just as easily be referring to a theory. He says: "Intellectual and scientific advance, ...consists of the displacement of one paradigm, which has become increasingly incapable of explaining new or newly discovered facts, by a new paradigm, which does account for those facts in a more satisfactory fashion." (Huntington, 1996, pp. 29-30). The problem is however, without getting into a long discussion about how Kuhn defines a paradigm, to my mind Huntington's description does not satisfactory convey the essence of what a paradigm change is. In *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, a paradigm change is explained as a shift or change that occurs by "revolutions" in which "an older paradigm is overthrown and is replaced by a framework incompatible or even incommensurate with it." (Audi, 1995, p. 557). There is an essential difference between these two descriptions and I will be keeping to the latter in my analysis.

A Historical Presentation of the Development of 'Visualizing Global Space' in the West

What does the concept 'visualizing of global space' entail and how is this concept significant in relation to Huntington's theory?

The ability to visualize global space is an essential development in western history, without which 'world' politics would be meaningless. According to Agnew, one of the defining elements of our 'modern' world is the "imaginative ability to transcend the spatial limits imposed by everyday life and contemplate the world conceived and grasped as a picture." (Agnew, 1998, p. 11). This capacity to see the world as a whole, was not possible until the outset of the European Age of Discovery, in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. From then on, global geographical visualization was an ever-changing concept that was affected by the various historical elements of the different historical periods. This ability has had a significant impact on western geopolitical thought and thereby politics. Huntington's theory is the latest and most significant contribution in this tradition. As Agnew states, "...the predominant ways world politics have been represented and acted on geographically by both major actors and commentators over the past two hundred years, must start with the origins and development of the capacity to see the world as a whole." (Agnew, 1998, p. 11).

According to Agnew it was as much the return of Magellan's crew in 1522, after having circumnavigated the globe, as Galileo's refutation of geocentrism that had a revolutionary impact on the European mind. Greer and Lewis also sees Magellan's voyage as significant to the development of the European mind because his expedition "...demonstrated conclusively that the earth was round, it dramatized the vastness of the Pacific, and it gave a truer idea of the globe's size." (Greer and Lewis, 1968, p. 295).

With the discovery of new lands, came the realization that "Europe was no longer the world and the world was no longer the center of the universe." (Agnew, 1998, p. 13). These developments did not only have an immense impact on the European worldview but it also affected the meaning of life. "The familiar vertical conception of the universe (the Great Chain of Being) that connected ordinary mortal Europeans into the universal scheme of things was challenged by an opening up of horizontal horizons that offered a new vision of the world and Europe's place in it." (Agnew, 1998, p. 13).

Since the medieval worldview was being challenged, an alternative framework was needed to understand the new world that was being 'discovered' by the Europeans.

World-As-A-Whole

Due to the new perspective of the world-as-a-whole, the Europeans were now mapping out a new model for understanding the world. The Renaissance rediscovery of Ptolemaic cosmography⁴ gave the Europeans a suitable model on which to work. Though his imagined world structure was inadequate even by Renaissance standards, it was a model that offered a ready substitute for the medieval worldview. The inadequacy of Ptolemy's model became an advantage in that it left room for the filling in of 'newly' invented or discovered lands or continents. Ptolemy's 'canvas' became the canvas where Renaissance geographers could map out their states political interests on the world map, with the notion that this was the objective view of the world.

In this new atmosphere maps became important tools in the development of the European view of the world and their place in it. Just as we today regard maps as a reliable or even an exact guide to our surroundings, so did the Renaissance man believe that his maps accurately reflected what was out there.⁵

The belief in the objectivity of the maps, in spite of the many speculative representations, was due to the fact that the perception of space had gained enormously in importance because of the exploration beyond the horizon. This was what had been lacking in Ptolemy's cosmography. Now it was not only possible to imagine the world as a whole but it was also possible to experience it as a whole. With the increasing 'experiencing' of the world, the European man also became increasingly an 'expert' on the different places he had been.

⁴ Ptolemy, a second-century Greek astronomer, in accordance with Aristotle's philosophy, placed the earth at the center of things resulting in a geocentric (earth-centered) theory that was upheld until the revolution of the seventeenth century.

⁵ Maps: Despite the obvious selectivity of maps, maps were regarded as accurate representations of the world, because of the belief in the virtue of 'direct observations'. In this light, maps did not simply mirror the world, rather they helped constitute it.

"Having been somewhere now provided a license to speculate about everywhere." (Agnew, 1998, p.13).

The cosmographical model of the ancient Greeks was no longer sufficient to explain the growing new world. Soon much more specialized studies such as Geography developed to better understand the immense variety that was being discovered and in order to categorize the 'unknown' into categories that were familiar to the European mind. In this way it was possible to control the unknown.

The Scientific Renaissance 'World View'

During the Renaissance era vision came to be regarded as the most 'noble' of the human senses. What was seen and then plotted in on the canvas of the world map, was what existed in the mind. The discovery of 'perspective' in the arts, especially helped establish the 'scientific' Renaissance 'world view'.⁶

The rise of 'perspective' in the Renaissance era had tremendous implication for the governing principle for both viewing and knowing. As "the language of knowing –perspective, view, vision, world view- was expressed in overwhelmingly visual terms" (Agnew, 1998, p. 17), direct observation competed now with the older texts, which had supplied man with his knowledge of the world up until then. The traditional authoritarian texts were no longer regarded as the only true source. As the standard scientific model developed so did the emphasis on 'direct observation'; this became essential as a reliable tool for the discovery of 'truths'.

Seeing the world-as-a-picture, that is encapsulating the world in the mind's eye, enables the self to separate from the world itself. In other words, the viewer is no longer tied to a particular location rather the viewer has an objective view of the world from nowhere. The development of this 'view from nowhere', is essential to the European geopolitical imagination. It is important to point out that the 'view from nowhere' is not unproblematic.

⁶ An artist would use 'perspective' to compose a drawing/painting that gives the impression that the objects that are drawn are represented correctly (relative height, width, depth, distance, etc.) in relation to each other.

This 'view from nowhere' serves to legitimize what is essentially a very partial view of the world. However, "this is not to say that such a view is *a priori* illegitimate intellectually and politically, only that the association of global geopolitical thinking with the self-defined 'interests' of specific states (such as Germany and Britain) tended to use the scientific claim to objectivity on behalf of a particular identity/interests (Agnew, 1998, p. 8). This critical perspective on the different geopolitical 'views from nowhere' is important in relation to my analysis of Huntington's theory. This will be developed as a central issue of this thesis.

Cartesian Perspectivalism

One of the common elements that characterizes the different geopolitical texts of the late nineteenth century was that their philosophical approach to reality, as with most intellectuals at that time, was grounded in Cartesian perspectivalism. This implies that knowledge is based on 'Cartesian cognito rationalism' or in simple terms, "the world is taken to be a reality that exists 'out there', separate from the consciousness of the intellectual." (Ó Tuathail, 1996, p. 23). In this Cartesian division between the inner self and the outer reality, the intellectual becomes the viewing subject and his world the viewed object. This Cartesian perspective is regarded as a "neutral and disembodied gaze." (Ó Tuathail, 1996, p. 23).

According to Ó Tuathail, the systems of knowledge that were constructed after the Cartesian perspectivalism, "promoted the simultaneous and synchronic over the historical and diachronic in the explanation and elaboration of knowledge." (Ó Tuathail, 1996, p. 24). It is interesting to note that this perspectival conception of knowing, which seems so familiar and unremarkable to us today, was in fact a "revolutionary shift in consciousness about the relationship of the self to the world (and others), even if it had earlier roots." (Agnew, 1998, p. 18).

In this new 'vision' of the world, where man saw himself both as external to the world (as an observer) and also as in the world (as an actor), made it easy to classify his world as a hierarchically ordered whole.

In order to highlight the significance of this concept of 'visualizing of global space' had/has on geopolitical texts, it is relevant to show how this concept specifically shapes and works within a geopolitical text. Here, Halford MacKinder's famous geopolitical theory provides an excellent example.

The Birth of Geopolitics: Halford Mackinder

The late nineteenth century saw a most important development of western visualization of global space. It was at this time that classical geopolitics was 'born'. This was the time when

the great powers of Europe scrambled to attain their 'share' of the African continent. As this imperial expansion continued, it became clear that the world political map was finite and limited. It was at this time that Halford Mackinder, the famous British geographer, presented the first real geopolitical overview over the global political situation at that time. A comparison of Mackinder's late nineteenth century geopolitical thoughts with Huntington's geopolitical ideas is very suitable for our purpose. Mackinder is especially relevant because he "helped establish and codify...a distinctive geographical gaze upon international politics." (Ó Tuathail, 1996, p. 25).

Mackinder introduced his geopolitical worldview at a time when it became clear that there was soon no more undiscovered space to attain. His geopolitical map was meant to be a guide for the politicians in this new stage of international politics. As many others at that time, Mackinder was aware of the changing conditions for international politics and was interested in drawing a new map which better represented the conditions of the new global world. According to Mackinder the world has now come to the end of its age of discovery and exploration, an epoch Mackinder has labelled as the 'Colombian epoch'.

The essential difference between the Colombian and the post-Colombian epoch is that now for the first time it is possible to achieve a worldview that can be applied to international politics. This new view is not only "global in a geographical sense but in an explanatory sense also." (Ó Tuathail, 1996, p. 29).

Mackinder reflected over the consequences of this newly attained worldwide view:

"It appears to me, therefore, that in the present decade we are for the first time in a position to attempt, with some degree of completeness, a correlation between the larger geographical and the larger historical generalizations. For the first time we can perceive something of the real world, and may seek a formula which shall express certain aspects, at any rate, of geographical causation in universal history. If we are fortunate, that formula should have a practical value as setting into perspective some of the competing forces in current international politics." (Mackinder, 1904).

Mackinder's view is in keeping with a Cartesian perspectivalism as he is the detached subject who is able to attain a full overview of the world. As Ó Tuathail put it: "The relationship

between the viewer and this worldwide stage is akin to that of a removed observer watching a theatrical production or a spectator viewing a panorama." (Ó Tuathail, 1996, p. 29).

By the nineteenth century, "knowing by seeing the world as a horizontal but hierarchically organized whole was finally institutionalised as the modern alternative to the vertical Great Chain of Being that had been dominant cosmology of the other older civilizations." (Agnew, 1998, p. 20).

To sum up, the ability to see the world as a structured whole has been one of the defining aspects of Western world politics. The Europeans relied in the beginning on the older works of the ancients to guide their understanding of the world. Ptolemy's cosmography provided the canvas from which to work. The concept of the Great Chain of Being was rapidly being replaced by a linear perspective. This 'visual' way of regarding one's surroundings resulted in separating the object being viewed from the viewing subject. This also accumulated into a hierarchical ordering of the parts of which the whole was made up. Parts could only make sense in relation to the whole. In this setting, maps attained a central role because the information on a map was regarded as 'objective' in that it was based on vision and it could easily represent parts in relation to the whole. "These conceptual innovations provided the backdrop for a more specific and recurring tendency to divide the world into two opposing zones, each of which defined the other by communicating what it is not." (Agnew, 1998, p. 30).

The Significance of the Concept of 'Visualizing of Global Space' to Huntington's Theory

Huntington's theory is the result of this horizontal worldview as opposed to the Great Chain of Being. In this view the world is seen as a hierarchically structured whole. Just as Mackinder tried to place the various elements that affected international politics of his time, into an all-encompassing global vision, so does Huntington a hundred years later. Even though his geopolitical gaze highlights different factors that effect international politics, Huntington's goal is the same as that of Mackinder: to achieve a worldwide view or map upon which politicians can best navigate. Huntington confirms that he "aspires to present a framework, a

paradigm, for viewing global politics that will be meaningful to scholars and useful to policymakers." (Huntington, 1996, p. 13).

Just like his predecessors, Huntington presents a worldview where the different parts are only understood in relation to the whole. In Huntington's civilizational geopolitical worldview, different relations and conflicts are not regarded individually, but understood only in relation to his civilizational worldview. As he says, "...the post-Cold War world is a world of seven or eight major civilizations. Cultural commonalities and differences shape the interests, antagonisms, and associations of states." (Huntington, 1996, p. 29).

Like other geopoliticians before him, Huntington adopts an 'Olympian Gods eye view' of the world. (Dalby, Ó Tuathail and Routledge, 1998, p. 110). From this 'scientific' perspective Huntington, in the same patriarchal and self confident spirit classifies our new world order after the principle 'the West against the rest' or 'the clash of civilizations'.

The result of this 'scientific' perspective is that different details and occurrences are only understood within the frame the geopolitician himself has created. All the parts can only be understood in relation to the whole. The result is that diversity and particularity disappears and one is left with homogenized geography.

As mentioned earlier another essential element in geopolitical constructions is classifying the world into a hierarchical system. These different geopolitical hierarchical systems are presented as 'scientific'. In actuality they are not classified after a scientific criteria, but after political interests.

If we use Halford Mackinder's geopolitical theory again as an example, we can clearly see that geographical areas are classified and understood in relation to how relevant they are to Mackinder's political dualistic construction of 'landpower' vs. 'seapower'. All nations are classified after this criteria. Britain and Russia/Germany are the King and Queen of the chess board while all the other countries are classified according to how much they can effect the power struggle in this game.

The problem is not operating with a hierarchical system in it's self, the problem is portraying theses hierarchical classifications as founded upon objective scientific criteria. If we look at

Huntington's theory we can see that this geopolitical tradition is still in use. Huntington states that "in the post-Cold War world, for the first time in history, global politics has become multipolar and multicivilizational", where the different civilizations in the future will have the same amount of influence over the direction the new world order will take (Huntington, 1996, p. 21). This statement must, however, be regarded more as a compulsory political correct statement, because it does not correspond to Huntington's description of his geopolitical map where the Muslims seems to be the major threat.

Huntington presents the different civilizations not as equal entities; on the contrary, they are in actual fact classified according to how much of a threat they represent in relation to the West.

The Islamic and Confusian civilization are ranked the highest and given the most attention in Huntington's civilizational theory because they are regarded as the biggest threat to western power and interests. The main divide therefore is between the West and Islam or China or a combination of the two. The other civilizations are classified according to their relationship and influence upon the different sides in this conflict.

According to Huntington's civilizational geopolitical map, China and Islam are ranked as the number one treat to the West because they have evidently shown more "cultural assertiveness and challenges to the West". (Huntington, 1996, p. 102). Huntington goes on to say that, "Related but different causes lie behind..." (Huntington, 1996, p. 102), the challenges coming from Asia and Islam. "Asian assertiveness is rooted in economic growth; Muslim assertiveness stems in considerable measure from social mobilization and population growth. Each of these challenges is having and will continue to have into the twenty-first century a highly destabilizing impact on global politics." (Huntington, 1996, p. 102).

The other civilizations are ranked as less of a threat to the west because Huntington argues,

In contrast, people in other non-western civilizations – Hindu, Orthodox, Latin American, African – may affirm the distinctive character of their cultures, but as of the mid-1990's had been hesitant about proclaiming their superiority to Western culture. Asia and Islam stand alone, and at times together, in their increasingly confident assertiveness with respect to the West (Huntington, 1996, p. 102).

Huntington is able to hierarchically classify the different civilizations in this supposedly scientific way, because he argues that cultural and civilizational factors are the primary elements that influence relationships and conflicts in our post-Cold War world. He says: "In the new world, however, cultural identity is the central factor shaping a country's associations and antagonisms. While a country could avoid Cold War alignment, it cannot lack an identity. The question, "Which side are you on?" has been replaced by the much more fundamental one, "Who are you?" Every state has to have an answer. That answer, is cultural identity, defines the state's place in world politics, its friends, and its enemies." (Huntington, 1996, p. 125). This notion is presented more or less as a 'fact' and if this is so then there is no problem classifying the various civilizations into a 'scientific' hierarchical system where civilizations are classified according to how much they have asserted themselves culturally in relation to the West.

When examining Huntington's theory, therefore, it is evident that his theory is not based on a 'view from nowhere' (a scientific objective view of how the global world works), rather it is very much a view of the world from a Western, or more precisely an American perspective.

At Mackinder's time, this quest to achieve an overview of the world political order was welcomed. A Conservative politician, Leo Amery, commenting on Mackinder's address to the Royal Geographical Society said;

It is always enormously interesting if we can occasionally get away from the details of everyday politics and try to see things as a whole, and this is what Mr Mackinder's most stimulating lecture has done for us tonight. He has given us the whole of history and the whole of ordinary politics under one big comprehensive idea (Ó Tuathail, 1996, p. 30).

Today, all encompassing overviews are received with much more scepticism than before, especially from the 'postmodern' intellectuals. This does not mean, however, that global overviews are not important and can be highly informative today. However, there are many significant criticisms that have been directed towards these global theories that are of importance when considering and understanding these theories.

There are many obstacles preventing us from seeing things as they really are in the history of geopolitics. The history of geopolitics shows us that, more often than not, the various geopolitical world-views, instead of representing reality, rather represent the political interest of a certain state or country. This factor is simply explained by the fact the geopoliticians are usually "active participants in the political scene of their day." (Parker, 1998, p. 156).

If we look at both Mahan⁷ and Mackinder's geopolitical world-views, it is generally accepted that it was politics behind their 'scientific' views; "Mahan was an admiral actively involved in promoting American sea power while Mackinder was a member of Parliament and a diplomat concerned with the security of the British Empire. The major concerns of both were with the best interests of their respective countries." (Parker, 1998, p. 156).

As Parker points out, "place and time of the observation appears to have been a major factor in the conclusions reached and the interpretations of reality which have been put upon them." (Parker, 1998, p. 157).

Modern geopolitical theories might not be much different. Many regard the contemporary geopolitical world-views no better than the medieval *mappa mundi*, which were constructed more after myth than of reality. They see these modern *mappa mundi* as an attempt to "...simplify a complex reality, and the perception of the nature of this simplified reality in terms of a particular set of ideas." (Parker, 1998, p. 157).

Parker points to another important aspect that arises when providing a simplified and a reliable worldview. That is "...the attempt to reconcile the dichotomy of the 'actual' and the 'should be' with the objective of being scientific." (Parker, 1998, p. 158). In other words, "It is the problem of distinguishing between the two which has in the past produced a geopolitics which has sought to prove and to advocate in the same breath. It is in the nature of a *mappa mundi* that it seeks less to attain objective truth than to sustain faith, and it is the former rather than the latter which is sacrificed when it has been expedient to do so." (Parker, 1998, p. 159). The motivation behind Mackinder's famous 'heartland' theory was to deliver a warning to his fellow countrymen of the extreme danger in the not too far future. He believed it was important for his countrymen to be aware that British power was not invincible and therefore

⁷ Alfred Mahan (1840-1914) an American naval historian

to take seriously the real threat and challenge coming from the continent. His point is made clear through these famous lines:

Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island;
Who rules the World-Island commands the World
(Mackinder, 1919, p. 150)

In a very similar fashion, Huntington tries to convince his readers that the West is in decline and that other civilizations pose a real threat because they are challenging not only the West's dominant position but its very existence! In his post Cold-War world where culture is the primary driving force in international politics, Huntington declares:

Rejection of the Creed and of Western civilization means the end of the United States of America as we have known it. It also means effectively the end of Western civilization
(Huntington, 1996, pp. 306-307).

There is however an essential difference between Mackinder and Huntington in this connection. While Mackinder personally believed in the threat he warned of, Huntington seems not to have the same degree of conviction about his own theory. A closer examination of his text, reveals that his theory is founded more on political interests than on political science. (This topic will be examined further in part 3 and 4)

Conclusion

With the help of geopolitical history it has been possible to deconstruct Huntington's theory in order to uncover the building blocks that constitute it. By focusing on one of the central concepts in geopolitical theories, namely 'visualizing of global space', it has been possible to question and shed light upon fundamental elements that make up Huntington's theory.

By examining the development of how 'global space' was understood in the West and how Huntington's theory is part of this tradition, it becomes clear that his civilizational worldview is more a continuation of a traditional and politically inspired worldview.

Huntington's geopolitical thesis, like classical geopolitics, is part of the western tradition of painting a worldwide view that claims to be scientific. We have seen that classical geopolitical worldviews were not as 'scientific' as they claimed to be. Today, is it reasonable to view Huntington's theory more as a result of a subjective political outlook, just as his predecessors have been interpreted?

Also in keeping with traditional western geopolitics, Huntington has drawn up a geopolitical civilizational worldview, which conveys a picture of the world as a structured 'whole', where the different parts are only understood in relation to the whole. In other words, Huntington has left little room for other important considerations, such as political interests because they do not fall within his geo-civilizational world order and therefore are excluded as being significant.

His claim that his theory represents a paradigm shift within the academic field of international relations is also questioned. As we have seen Huntington's theory is built upon many of the same concepts and principles as previous geopolitical text and therefore the claim that his theory should be regarded as a paradigm within international relations stands on shaky ground. This question and other aspects to Huntington's theory will be developed further in the following chapters.

2.3 The 'Other' in Geopolitics

In this chapter I will be examining another essential concept in the structure of western geopolitical thinking, namely the 'Other'. With the help of older geopolitical texts it will be attempted to show that there is a continuation of the same fundamental principles in which the 'Other' is understood in Western geopolitical history and how it works within Huntington's theory.

As in the previous chapter, this chapter not only places Huntington's theory within a Western geopolitical tradition, but by deconstructing his theory and uncovering the building blocks that the theory is made up of, it is possible to answer questions such as whether his theory can be regarded as a new paradigm within international relations, why culture has become the primary determinant when defining the 'Other' and what purpose this serves in Huntington's new world order theory.

The first part of the chapter is basically a short historical overview over how the 'Other' has been defined, used and classified in the history of geopolitics. This is necessary in order to have a basis on which to compare Huntington's use and description of the 'Other'. It is important to remember that such a simplified outline is just a tool in which to simplify the enormous quantity of history that there is. Such an outline is only there to help the reader grasp the essential developments that are relevant to a particular topic, perspective or theory. It is, therefore, vital to keep in mind that such a historical presentation of how the 'Other' was perceived in these different geopolitical 'eras', is fairly simple and that there are, of course, overlapping and continuity of certain characteristics. In other words, older themes from older discourses were worked into the new discursive space. For instance, as we shall see, the concept of backward versus modern polarity and the idea of 'national security', have been recurring themes.

Defining the 'Other'

The concept of the 'Other' has always played a central role in human history, it has been especially vital to the development of a sense of 'Self'. Just as the 'Self' cannot see its self as distinct without the 'Other', so is the idea of Europe as a coherent social-geographical entity, made possible by what it is not. This way of identifying oneself in relation to the 'Other', works on all the different levels of society, from the development of a child's identity all the way up to the establishing the identity of a civilization. The philosophizing over the role of the 'Other' can therefore be found in many different academic fields. As far back as Herodotus, it is possible to trace the human preoccupation and problematization of 'other cultures'. As Francois Hartog, reviles in his book, *Mirror of Herodotus*, Herodotus describes the Scythians and the Persians as barbarian 'Others'.

The concept of the 'Other' is central to Huntington's theory, already, on the second page of his book, Huntington reflects over the role of the 'Other'. It is interesting to note that Huntington, when touching on the topic of how the 'Other' is essential in the definition of the Self, adds a more negative constellation by referring to the 'Other' not only as an 'Other', but as an enemy. In this regard the 'Other' is not only different but also a threat. He also implies that the notion of the 'Other' as an enemy is a 'truth'. Huntington quotes from Michael Dibdin's novel, *Dead Lagoon*: "There can be no true friends without true enemies. Unless we hate what we are not, we cannot love what we are. These are the old truths we are painfully rediscovering..." (Huntington, 1996, p. 20). Huntington finds here support for his own thesis,

The unfortunate truth in these old truths cannot be ignored by statesmen and scholars. For people seeking identity and reinventing ethnicity, enemies are essential, and the potentially most dangerous enmities occur across the fault lines between the world's major civilizations (Huntington, 1996, p. 20).

What is interesting in this line of thought is that he gives no real explanation for why this is an 'old truth'. That is, he gives no other explanation, than this statement from a literary work. This is, however, presented in such a way that we are left with the impression that it is a scientific truth. That 'enemies are essential', 'for peoples seeking identity and reinventing ethnicity', is by far not a scientific explanation that deserves to be labeled as truth.

The 'Other' in Western Geopolitical History

The 'Other' has always played a central role in human history and especially so in the development of the western geopolitical imagination. In Geopolitics the boundaries and divisions are mainly on a large scale. In this context the concept of the 'Other' would be useful for defining a different landmass, continent, civilization or even such a large divide as the famous East/West divide. What is interesting is who decides where the boundaries should be drawn. According to John Agnew, it is material resources that make it possible for some states and not for others to impose social-geographical boundaries on others. It is relevant therefore to examine how the identities and boundaries of West Europe have been constructed with the help of the 'Other'.

Long before the concept of geopolitics was invented, the concept of the 'Other' played a central role in Europe's identity formation. There is evidence that the most basic division between Europe and other continents was already established in the seventh century. The oldest surviving map of the world identifies three continents, Asia, Europe and Africa. It seems that the map was constructed along the lines of the old biblical story of the three sons of Noah populating the different continents after the Great Flood, where Shem represents Asia, Ham Africa, and Japheth Europe.

As time went on this division of Europe from its surroundings was reinforced by various influential elements. Among these elements, Christianity played a major part and the glorification of the Greek and the Roman legacy was also vital. The expansion of the Ottoman Turkish Empire also helped to specify the European identity even further, and, of course, just as the Romans before them, the 'new' people they encountered that were beyond the 'boundaries' of Europe were regarded as pagan or barbarian. All of these elements helped to establish the heightened regard the Europeans developed of their own identity as time passed.

By the time, the Europeans were far exceeding other civilizations in their technological and material advancements and as a result, gained an enormous amount of confidence, Europe's sense of superiority was quickly being established and the 'Other' was almost always portrayed as the complete opposite to the European 'Self'. It was also around this triumphant time of European history that geopolitical thoughts were starting to develop.

Why did the Europeans acquire such a black and white conception of the relationship between themselves ('we') and the rest of the world (the 'Other')? Agnew claims, supported by Edward Said's *'Orientalism'*, that imperial political aspirations lay behind the developing conception of the 'Other'. In Europe's pursuit of more territory, facts were created to legitimize their expansion. In his famous book, *'Orientalism'*, Edward Said, sees the dialectical description by which the Europeans separates themselves from the people of the East as part of the creation of their self-image. Even though the characteristics of the 'Other' was little known, the Other came to represent what the European was not. Just as Said claims that the characteristics of the Eastern 'Other' was by far built on empirical evidence, so Agnew states that the European "geographical imagination need not have much empirical content." (Agnew, 1998, p. 22).

The most important divide in the history of geopolitics, is the East/West divide. This dualism has its roots in ancient times and had many different manifestations. It works with and confirms other divides that manifest the geopolitical visions of how the world can be divided.

The idea of different levels of civilizations was part of the European classification of the 'Other'. The European would classify the worlds beyond Europe, old as well as newly discovered 'Others', according to how advanced they were in relation to European standards. Progress could, however, be achieved if the other non-European civilizations followed the same pattern of progress that the Europeans had mapped out.

As the Europeans discovered more of the world, the vast differences that it contained was characterized and placed neatly into their system of global cultural hierarchy. The main division was between East and West, and therefore the local differences were understood in relation to this divide. Even within Europe the East/West divide was essential in creating the boundaries that marked clearly where Europe ended and Asia began. As we shall see later, this is alive and well in Huntington's theory.

The main elements that were focused on in relation to defining the European identity at this time, were civilizational characteristics. Europeans regarded their own civilization as unique, distinct and, of course, more advanced than other civilizations/cultures. In this environment, the 'Other' was also described and classified along 'civilizational' characteristics.

Where previously the 'Other' was understood and classified according to 'civilizational' characteristics, in the late nineteenth century however, the idea of 'race', entered into the equation. Agnew points out that there was "...little or no evidence of a conscious idea of 'race' before the sixteenth century. It's 'high point' was not reached until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when the fine distinctions of 'scientific racism' replaced older, more informal means of drawing racial boundaries." (Agnew, 1998, p. 23).

At this time there was a gradual shift in how the world was perceived and ordered. Up until 1945, it was the 'natural' character of states, as predators and competitors, that assumed a key position. In this period of 'natural' geopolitics, the human was understood in terms of natural processes and phenomena, a process akin to the new understanding of biological processes that also marked this period. One of the main achievements of this period was that it managed to "depoliticized inter-imperial rivalry into a set of natural and determining geographical 'facts of life'." (Agnew, 1998, p. 97).

It was during this period that 'geopolitics' was born. As so many other academic fields, the birth of geopolitics must also be understood as a result of the changing historical conditions taking place at that time. The end of the nineteenth century was an era of intense nationalism in Europe, state expansionism, and overseas empire building, made possible through technological developments in transportation, weaponry etc., all of which helped to form the basis of geopolitical thinking.

The 'Other' in 'Naturalized' Geopolitics.

As a consequence of this 'naturalization' trend, another dimension was added to the conception and discourse of the 'Other'. The 'Other' was not only understood as different because of difference in civilization/cultural terms, but was different also in racial terms. With the help of Darwin's theory of natural selection, the Europeans regarded themselves as superior to other races. The other races were classified according to how far the European believed the particular 'Other' had come in this natural process of human development. As a result of the influence of social Darwinism, there was now less room for progress to be made by the 'Other'. Before, there was a possibility of reaching a higher level of development

if only the 'Other' learned and embraced the ideas of the western civilization. But now the 'Other' was also determined by natural/biological characteristics that could not be altered and therefore allowed little room for development.

The Darwinian ideology had an enormous impact on how the 'Other' was understood and defined. Not only as we have seen was the 'Other' now classified after 'natural' biological criteria, that resulted in a hierarchical placement of civilizations/races, but also in the 'naturalization' of the 'Other' as an enemy. Before the 'Other' was regarded as an enemy, but this notion was not however backed with 'scientific' reasoning. Now since the world was understood in terms of Social Darwinism, the notion that the Other as an enemy was now scientifically legitimized. In this survival game it was either 'us' or 'them'.

In the previous chapter, Halford Mackinder's geopolitical thinking was used as a relevant source to compare Huntington's theory, again reference to his geopolitics is relevant. As an Englishman, Mackinder was preoccupied with the future of England at the end of the nineteenth century. He was afraid that the British empire was being challenged by a threat which was rising in the East, namely from the Russians or the Germans or a combination of the two. In trying to convince his fellow Englishmen of the eastern peril, which could soon become a serious threat to the British empire, he sought support in ancient Greek literature. Mackinder believed that the classical East/West conflict between the Greek 'seamen' and the Persian 'landsmen', was a classical theme which had endured throughout European history. The eastern 'Other' had always been there as a threat, but just in different guises such as Persian, Byzantine, Arab, Ottoman and Russian Empires. When trying to legitimize his conviction of the Russian and German threat, he refers to the story of the barbarian invasions of Europe from Asia (Dalby, Ó Tuathail and Routledge, 1998). In this way the classical understanding of the East/West divide was incorporated into a new and completely different historical situation.

Thus in the early days of the twentieth century Mackinder's world-view and his understanding and use of the 'Other', which had its roots in the wars of the Greeks and the Persians, became the basis for the first geopolitical theory which attempted to make sense of the complex relationships among the diverse component parts of the world's geopolitical space (Parker, 1998, pp. 93-94). Written as a warning to the western peacemakers at Versailles in 1919 about a German expansion in the East, his book, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, has had

considerable influence on western political thought. The book was even reprinted during WWII. As we shall see many of his principle ideas can be found in Huntington's theory and this is especially true of his use of the concept of the 'Other'.

When examining how the 'Other' was understood and used in geopolitics at this time, it is of interest to point out that geopolitical thought had also made it's way to the United States. By 1904 the United States had entered onto the world stage as a significant player. Contrary to the anti-imperialist image the Americans wanted to convey of themselves to the rest of the world, they had their share of colonies within what they had defined as their hemisphere.

Just as with the Europeans, the 'Other', was central to American legitimization of their imperialism in Latin America and the Philippines etc. American geopolitical discourse also drew strong lines between the space of the 'self' and the space of the 'Other'. Just as with other cultural maps, American geopolitical discourse is given shape by a frontier, which separates civilization from savagery.

A major part of their justification of imperialist expansion was based on the argument that the task of the United States was to uplift and civilize the 'Other'. Therefore acquiring the Philippines as a colony and acting as imperial overlord of Cuba, and also acquiring the Hawaiian islands and Guam, was seen as part of this 'civilizing' process.

President Theodore Roosevelt's ideas can serve as a perfect example of this way of understanding the Other within the global world view. He says,

It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger or entertains any projects as regards the other nations of the Western Hemisphere save such as are for their welfare. All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous...Chronic wrongdoing or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation.⁸

Again we can detect the influence of Social Darwinism. Roosevelt and the other prominent imperialists operated with the belief that there was a natural hierarchy of 'races'. However,

⁸ Roosevelt's quote is to be found in: (Dalby, Ó Tuathail and Routledge, 1998)

their understanding of 'race' was a rather flexible one which referred to nationality, language, culture and manners as much as it did to skin color and biological and genetically determinists. In this view there was room for mobility by not so civilized races to move up the ladder to a higher level of civilization.

When examining the 'Other' in geopolitical history, it is clear that the description and understanding of the 'Other' was one of the elements in geopolitical discourse which helped to legitimize the nations real political and material interests. Just as this was true then, it is true now.

Unlike Hitler and the Nazi's, Roosevelt and Mackinder understood civilization more in terms of space, not race. In this way therefore, their understanding of the Other in civilizational terms are not that unlike Huntington's understanding of the Other. However, though he presumably does not operate with the notion that one civilization is more superior than another, he does however, as mentioned before, pay less attention to some civilizations and even excludes a whole continent on the grounds that they are not too significant when it comes to understanding the new world order.

The Germans were not able to gain as much from imperialist geopolitics as the seapowers of the West, but they shared their white supremacist sentiment and were better at systemizing it (Dalby, Ó Tuathail and Routledge, 1998, p. 19).

Because of the devastating consequences of the crimes of the Nazi regime of Germany, classification of the world map was no longer drawn up after the principles of 'naturalized' geopolitics. As a result, almost over night in 1945, the geopolitical world map changed. For one thing geopolitics came under a lot of criticism and was not highly regarded among most academics. Classification of the world map was no longer done after the same principles of 'naturalized' geopolitics.

According to Agnew, "the outcome of the war brought an end to the geopolitical order of inter-imperial rivalry and created the conditions for the construction of a new postwar geopolitical order." (Agnew, 1998, p. 105). This new world saw the breakup of the old colonial powers and the emergence of two strong powers, both with distinct ideological political aspirations. However, the other/others were again understood and classified in

relation to the East/West bipolar dimension, but only now there were different principles/elements that were the primary focus.

The new world was drawn up after ideological characteristics, such as ideas, symbols, and strategies for promoting or changing a social and cultural order (Agnew, 1998, p. 105).

The 'Other' as Described in the 'Ideological' Phase of Cold War Geopolitics.

Cold War geopolitics can simply be described as the period in which two superpowers with competing models of modernity, raced to expand and secure their interests in relation to the 'dangerous' other superpower. During the Cold War the geopolitical imagination was centered around competing conceptions of how best to organize the international political economy.

After the second World War the world map was no longer a vacuum waiting to be filled by a few leading European countries. However, even though both the United States and the Soviet Union claimed to advocate anti-colonial sentiments, they both engaged in imperial competition. In this Cold War competition, like previous geopolitical competition, characterizing the other as 'what I am not' and as a potent danger to one's own existence, still played a central role. During the Cold War the world was mapped out after a homogenized representation of space where you belonged either to a 'friendly' bloc or a 'threatening' bloc. In order to maintain this geopolitical construction of bipolarity, it was essential to convince one's own population and the population under one's sphere of influence, of the 'real' danger the other presented. As time has shown these negative and one-sided representations from both sides were usually extreme exaggerations. A country's own ideals were compared to the 'realities' of the 'Other'.

When examining how the 'Other' was portrayed and understood in the Cold War era, there are clear signs that older principles and discourses have been worked into the new discursive space.

As we have seen in the imperialist period, the 'Other' has always been essential in the manifestation of one's own identity, and during the cold war it was no different. For example, in the US, at this time, "the threat of things 'un-American' or 'anti-Soviet' became central to

national identity". (Agnew, 1998, p. 108). In order to ensure that the US government had the population behind it, when pursuing its interests as a superpower, exaggerating the danger that the 'Other' presented became an important means in which to secure public opinion. For example, from the 1960's to the 1980's there were systematic exaggerations in official US estimates of Soviet military spending and of the capability the Soviet military had (Agnew, 1998, p. 109).

During the cold war, both the Americans and the Russians incorporated the strong division between the space of the 'self' and the space of the 'other' onto the global scale. Both Americans and Russians have long traditions of their political discourse and identity being shaped around the experience of the internal frontier. As these two nations were being developed the internal frontier had acted as a dividing line between civilization and savagery, and played an essential role in their identity formation. Agnew observes that;

...the entire course of American history is read in many school history texts as a realization of Manifest Destiny: that Americans are a chosen people destined to expand in territory, wealth and influence. Similarly, in the Soviet case, Russians long saw themselves as the bringers of light into the cultural darkness of Siberia and Central Asia. The closeness of the colonial frontier allowed each to think of itself as engaged in something quite different from the nasty imperialism of the real Europeans (Agnew, 1998, p. 114).

Also during the Cold War, the nuclear arms race made the gorge even wider between the two superpowers. The 'Other' became even more evil, because of the enormous destruction it could inflict upon the other part. In other words the distinctiveness of the two superpowers were highlighted even further.

George Kennan's famous 'Mr. X' article, published in *Foreign Affairs*, (Huntington's theory of the Clash of Civilizations was first presented here.) contributed a great deal to the image of the Russians as a dangerous 'Other' which has to be contained. A strong containment policy was the only way to deal with this barbaric 'Other', the only language they understood. Kennan and many other intellectuals believed that his article was misinterpreted and that he never meant that the Soviet Union was a military threat, only a cultural and ideological threat, his ideas however became a major part of the Cold War fascination with the Communist 'Other'.

Kennan, who was a former diplomat to Russia, described the Soviet economy and industry as for the time being relatively poor and primitive. In his article he states:

It is difficult to see how these deficiencies can be corrected at an early date by a tired and dispirited population working largely under the shadow of fear and compulsion. And as long as they are not overcome, Russia will remain economically a vulnerable, and in a certain sense an impotent, nation, capable of exporting its enthusiasms and of radiating the strange charm of its primitive political vitality but unable to back up those articles of export by the real evidences of material power and prosperity (Kennan, 1947).

Even though Kennan did not regard the Soviet Union as a military threat, his views were pounced upon by more hardline anti-communist elements and they managed also with the help of Mackinder's old geopolitical theory, to portray the Soviet Union as a historically and geographically determined power with an unfolding necessity to constantly expand. In other words George Kennan's article reinforced the Soviet Union as a evil threatening 'Other' against which a hard line containment policy was the only political solution.

Huntington's 'Other'

When examining the role of the 'Other' through the different geopolitical eras, it is evident that even though the material/historical conditions change with time, many fundamental ideas essentially remain the same. In other words, the same principles and elements in which the 'Other' is understood by in earlier epochs is handed down and worked into the new discursive space. For instance the principle, 'backward versus modern polarity' and the idea of 'national security', are two easily recognizable elements of the 'Other' that can be found in most geopolitical discourses.

As his predecessors, Huntington operates with the traditional East/West divide; his Eastern 'Other' however, has just moved a little further to the South-East after the Cold War. Following in the footsteps of the Orientalist tradition, all of his 'Others' are classified along a backward versus modern continuum. Even though Huntington does not advocate that the

other civilizations should strive towards Western modern standards, it is clear that in his view the West is by far the more advanced and superior society. He says:

Those (societies) with Western Christian heritages are making progress toward economic and democratic politics; the prospects for economic and political development in the Orthodox countries are uncertain; the prospects in the Muslim republics are bleak (Huntington, 1996, p. 29).

And the main reason for this implied failure of progress of the other civilizations is due to their culture. Huntington states: "...the major differences in political and economic development among civilizations are clearly rooted in their different cultures." (Huntington, 1996, p. 29).

In our post Cold War era there is a reemphasis on cultural identities and Huntington is at the forefront of this 'new' trend. He understands the 'Other' primarily on the basis of the concept of culture. This development is interesting because, as we have seen, a century or so earlier, civilizational/cultural characteristics were also central when characterizing and understanding the 'Other'. An interesting question is, why this return to cultural aspects now? Might it be that civilizational/cultural aspects for now serve a purpose in western international politics, when ideology is no longer a challenge.

At the time of the Cold War "...ideology was understood to be the primary determinant of a person." (Alker, Shapiro, 1996, p. 170). Huntington argues that today culture is the primary determinant of a person.

He says: " In the post-cold War world, the most important distinction among peoples are not ideological, political or economic. They are cultural." (Huntington, 1996, p. 21). In this way Huntington is defining how the other is to be understood in the new political discourse.

During the Cold War the globe was mapped on a grid of ideology. The new world order, according to Huntington, is mapped on a grid of culture.

Today, with the help of Huntington, American geopolitical discourse is being constructed around 'cultural principles'. There is evidence that the American political discourse has started to concern it self with the 'nature of people', rather than the doctrines of their government.

Before moving on in the discussion, it is important to distinguish between two different levels of discussion taking place within the civilizational debate, in order to avoid confusion and misunderstanding, if not the the discussion could easily result in a meaningless discourse.

At one level you have discussions focusing on different descriptions and conceptions of various cultures, such as the hot topic of the relationship between the religion of Islam and fundamentalism (or the question of how various cultures react to and adopt modernity better than others etc.) At this level there is not really a question of whether culture matters or not, it is rather a question of how and to what degree culture plays a part.

At a different level the question of whether culture matters or not, does become significant. The question is, when constructing a world order paradigm, is it legitimate to map it out with the concept of civilization as the guiding principle? Or put differently, individuals all across the world are influenced by their various cultures in how they think and act etc., but is it viable to give cultural characteristics the same amount of importance when it comes to the actions of nation states?

It is significant here to point out that Huntington does not clearly distinguish between how culture affects persons and how it affects nations. When arguing that culture is now the primary determinant in international relations, he mixes these two conveniently. The question is, when discussing the primary mover of nations in our post-Cold War world, is it legitimate not to have a clear distinction between what moves people and what moves nations?

Huntington says, "In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinction among people are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural." (Huntington, 1996, p. 21) This may be, but this is not to say that this is the case concerning nations. Without any reflection concerning this distinction, Huntington says in the next sentence, "People and nations are attempting to answer the most basic question humans can face: Who are we?" (Huntington, 1996, p. 21) As a result, the main argument in Huntington's theory that "...culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world." (Huntington, 1996, p. 20) is really an argument that is first discussed in relation to persons and then transferred without any reflection over on to the concept of nations. The question is, do nations operate along the same principles as individual humans? This essential distinction is missing from Huntington's theory.

The 'Other' as an Enemy

Huntington is trying to bring back order after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Representing the 'Other' as an enemy is an essential part of Huntington's theory. Huntington's says: "Unless we hate what we are not, we cannot love what we are." (Huntington, 1996, p. 20). And a page later he states again, "We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against." (Huntington, 1996, p. 21).

Just as his predecessors, the 'Other' as an enemy helps to simplify the geopolitical map along a bipolar continuum. Just as Mackinder easily portrays the Russian/German Eastern 'Other' as an enemy, so does Huntington understand his Eastern 'Other' as an enemy.

Seeing the 'Other' as an enemy, in many cases, also helps to justify the political conduct that a nation inflicts upon an 'evil' 'Other'. In this way, just as with previous historical eras, the real and material interests of a nation can be hidden behind an 'ideological' argument of battling evil. Following this line of thought, in order to convince his readers that in the future we will see global conflicts due to difference in culture, it is not enough that the 'Other' is different, it needs to be an enemy.

'Enemy', the word in its self causes the reader to automatically understand the relationship between the Self and the 'Other' in a much more negatively deterministic conflict prone situation. The choice of words here makes major difference in the way his theory is perceived.

After the Cold War, Americans lost a very important element that helped define what they represented, namely the Communist 'Other'. With this threatening 'Other' gone, there appeared a vacuum that many conservatives were afraid of. The collapse of the Soviet Union, not only disrupted western geopolitical presumptions, but disrupted American cultural life! The containment of Communism as a dangerous pollutant has been central to American culture for a half a century. This danger, this 'Other', has therefore been one of the central elements influencing American life, identity, politics etc. A 'new' threatening 'Other', helps place the American 'Self' back in the world after the Cold War.

American identity is very much connected to the 'Other'. One of the reasons why the 'Other' plays such a large role in this connection is because "...of the constant foregrounding of America as a postulated, idealized space rather than as a historically grounded one, and because of its special status as a nation of constantly shifting boundaries." (Alker, Shapiro, 1996, p. 167).

The dominant political discourse in the United States has, therefore, been concerned with protecting the American identity, policing and locating allies and enemies, etc. As the threat of things un-American from the Soviet 'Other', helped to define one's identity before, the threat of things un-American from the Muslim 'Other' is policing the American identity now. This topic will be elaborated further in chapter 3.2: Huntington's theory, a discourse of danger?

The 'Other' in geopolitical texts helps define the boundaries and definition of the 'Self'. In other words, how the 'Other' is understood and used tells us in reality more about our own interests and identity. If this is a legitimate interpretation, then is it possible to claim that Huntington's theory tells us more about American identity and foreign policy, then about a coming clash of civilizations?

During the Cold War, the strong division between the two superpowers was kept up partly because of the exaggeration of the difference and danger of the 'Other'. If we look at Huntington's description of the 'Other' and how this helps to paint a dualistic geopolitical dangerous map in which a strong containment policy of the 'Other' is necessary, there are too many points of comparison to Cold War geopolitical texts to be ignored.

Like Kennan, Huntington describes the other as the opposite of what the 'Self' is, and that these characteristics of the 'Other' are historically and geographically tied down. In other words, there is no room for particularities or overlapping characteristics. In both their descriptions there are easily defined demarcations and the world is made up of stable homogenized groups of peoples that are culturally and historically fundamentally different from each other.

Both Kennan and Huntington's description of the 'Other' is presented as 'scientific' truth.

Kennan states:

...fortified by the lessons of Russian history: of centuries of obscure battles between nomadic forces over the stretches of a vast unfortified plain. Here caution, circumspection, flexibility and deception are the valuable qualities; and their value finds natural appreciation in the Russian or oriental mind (Kennan, 1947).

In the same way, Huntington also describes Muslims, today's Eastern 'Other', as different and dangerous, not mainly because of material political reasons, but because of historical cultural fundamental characteristics of their civilization. He states: "Islam's borders are bloody, and so are its innards." (Huntington, 1996, p. 258). In a footnote he defends this statement with the argument; "I made that judgment on the basis of a casual survey of intercivilizational conflicts. Quantitative evidence from every disinterested source conclusively demonstrates its validity." (Huntington, 1996, p. 258). Continuing his argument over many pages, along with demographic and political arguments he also supplies the reader with historical and cultural reasons for why Muslims are in his opinion more violent than other peoples from other cultures. He says;

...Islam has from the start been a religion of the sword and ...it glorifies military virtues. Islam originated among "warring Bedouin nomadic tribes" and this "violent origin is stamped in the foundation of Islam. Muhammad himself is remembered as a hard fighter and a skillful military commander." (No one would ever say this about Christ or Buddha.)...the Koran and other statements of Muslim beliefs contain few prohibitions on violence, and a concept of nonviolence is absent from Muslim doctrine and practice (Huntington, 1996, p. 263).

As his predecessors, in the Cold War Huntington exaggerates the threat from the 'Other' and leaves no room for dialog with this new threat. Contact between 'us' and 'them' will only lead to more conflict, he claims.

Huntington's Reflection over the Topic 'Us and Them'

Huntington's use and understanding of the 'Other' mirror his predecessors. The 'Other' is clearly still in the East. He uses many pages to convince the reader that we have nothing in

common and that contact between us will not lead to understanding and cooperation, on the contrary, it will only lead to conflict. The 'Other' is also very dangerous and if we do not resist the 'Other' and its culture, it means the end of our civilization. In other words, as we have seen, Huntington carries on a very long tradition of understanding the world in relation to 'us' and 'them'. It is therefore surprising that he rejects the notion of 'us' and 'them'.

In the beginning of his book, or more precisely in the first chapter, Huntington presents very briefly, before presenting his own, other world theories, which in his mind are not adequate to explain the global world in the post Cold War era. One of these theories that he disregards before moving on to his own theory is 'Two Worlds: Us and Them'. What is interesting in this short one page description of this theory is that it highlights the many paradoxes included in Huntington's book.

The biggest question mark readers are left with when reading this section, is Huntington's condemnation of an understanding of the world as a bipolar place, divided between 'us and them'. He says, "People are always tempted to divide people into us and them, the in-group and the other, our civilization and those barbarians." (Huntington, 1996, p. 32). He goes on to say that "a two-part world picture may in some measure correspond with reality", but on the whole it is unsatisfactory (Huntington, 1996, pp. 32-33).

Most surprisingly he agrees with Edward Said's criticism of the orientalist tradition and says;

The unity of the non-West and the East-West dichotomy are myths created by the West. These myths suffer the defects of the Orientalism which Edward Said appropriately criticized for promoting 'the difference between the familiar (Europe, the West, 'us') and the strange (the Orient, the East, 'them') and for assuming the inherent superiority of the former to the latter (Huntington, 1996, p. 33).

After having read this, the reader would start to wonder whether all the criticism that has been directed towards Huntington's theory is exaggerated. But the readers puzzlement is quickly relieved when Huntington states at the end of this section, "Instead of 'East and West', it is more appropriate to speak of 'the West against the rest', which at least implies the existence of many non-Wests. The world is too complex to be usefully envisioned for most purposes as

simply divided economically between North and South or culturally between East and West." (Huntington, 1996, p. 33).

Huntington's theory proclaims a multipolar/multicivilizational world. This is misleading. In reality his theory does not advocate a multipolar/multicivilizational world. On the contrary, his theory operates very much with the old bipolar world system. His world map is not a map with seven or eight entities operating, it is a map with two distinct entities, 'Us and them' or in Huntington's own words: "the West and the rest". (Huntington, 1996, p. 33).

It is a paradox that he claims to agree with Said's criticism of the Orientalist tradition when it is clear that Huntington's theory can easily be placed within the orientalist tradition. He says the world is too complex to be divided into 'East and West', but is the division 'the West and the rest' much different? The fact is that he still operates with the old simplified dualistic mental construction. When he talks of the coming clash of civilizations, most civilizations are hardly discussed or considered, if they are it is only to present a seemingly multipolar world where all civilizations are players. The fact is, that in Huntington's geopolitical map the Islamic civilization or the Confusian civilization or a combination of the two are placed as opponents to the Western civilization (as defined by Huntington). All the other civilizations are understood or defined in relation to this bipolar construction. It is bipolar in the sense that the Islamic and Confusian civilizations are not understood as opponents to each other, only as opponents to the West.

The Muslim Other/ Orientalism

When discussing the role of the 'Other' in western geopolitical history, it is impossible to avoid the topic of Orientalism. The term Orientalism is of course a very vague term and needs a clearer explanation, but for now it is enough to explain why it is a relevant part to this chapter.

Using Edward Said as a guide, Orientalism can in simplified terms be understood as "...a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient's special place in European Western Experience." (Said, 1978, p. 1).

For this chapter the most relevant aspect of this long historical relationship with the Orient, is that the Orient represents in the western mind, "...one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other." (Said, 1978, p. 1).

Even though Edward Said mainly uses literary works to exemplify the tradition and consequences of Orientalism, I believe however that many of his arguments in his work 'Orientalism' are of interest to my investigation into how the Other has been described and used in geopolitical history.

In the Orientalist tradition, Huntington's Other is also conveyed as irrational, backward and potentially dangerous. According to Said, one of the things that characterize an orientalist discourse is the preoccupation with 'difference'. Orientalists concentrate on aspects which divide rather than aspects which unite, on difference rather than on sameness. And with Huntington there is no exception. He says; "For more than three thousand years after civilizations first emerged, the contacts among them were, with some exceptions, either nonexistent or limited or intermittent and intense. The nature of these contacts is well expressed in the word historians use to describe them: 'encounters'. Civilizations were separated by time and space." (Huntington, 1996, p. 48).

Despite the fact that there is an enormous amount of literature and tradition, which contradict this notion of cultural homogenized entities, Huntington conveniently decides to disregard information that does not correspond well with his hypothesis.

He is furthering the illusion that there have been hardly any interaction between civilizations and in this way leaves the impression that civilizations are 'homogenized' entities.

When analyzing this Orientalist tradition, many postmodern theories such as Said and Foucault regard the orientalist discourse as ultimately about the origins of the West, not the origins of the East. Following this methodological analysis, this too can support the claim that Huntington's theory tells us more about American foreign policy and identity than it tells us about either the threat of the Muslim civilization or the coming of a clash of civilizations.

The problem of the 'Other' is a universal problem, it is reasonable to believe that all societies create an 'insider-outsider' division. Therefore a negative concept of the 'Other' is not a problem peculiar to the Occident.

Conclusion

The 'Other', as we have seen, is a central concept within geopolitical texts. By deconstructing Huntington's theory with the help of geopolitical history, we have seen how Huntington's 'Other' works within a conceptual world order that is similar to older geopolitical texts. The 'Other' is portrayed as relatively stable and homogenized, and is also described in terms that can easily be viewed as a negation to the 'Self'. Huntington like his predecessors in the western geopolitical tradition has managed to supply the western world with a new enemy after the collapse of the Cold War. The 'Other' is essential because without a clearly different and defined enemy, in Huntington's own words, the world "is likely to lack the clarity and stability of the Cold War and to be a more jungle-like world of multiple dangers, hidden traps, unpleasant surprises and moral ambiguities." (Huntington, 1993)

What is significant here is not really how Huntington describes the 'Other', but what role the concept of the cultural 'Other' serves in his conceptual world order.

For instance, by making culture the primary driving force, not only for the 'Other' but also for 'Us', it can be claimed that Huntington's theory has contributed to the acceptance of the concept of culture within the leading political international discourse. Just a few years ago, it was unheard of to use the concept of culture when trying to explain how the international political scene operates. The significance of this is that Huntington's geo-civilizational map, where the 'Other' is only understood along cultural terms, can easily hide other important factors that are essential when it comes to understanding the new international situation.

Another significant element that this chapter also highlights, is the sub-claim that Huntington's theory cannot be regarded as a new paradigm within international relations. For instance, Huntington's description of the 'Other' along cultural terms is new when seen in a short perspective, but not when his text is examined along a longer continuum. We have seen how MacKinder and other nineteenth century geopoliticians described and understood their 'Other' with cultural characteristics. This similar aspect between Huntington's theory and a hundred year older geopolitical theories, questions whether Huntington's theory can be regarded as a 'revolution' in world order theories.

Before leaving the historical context of geopolitics, I would like to examine a dimension that had an impact on geopolitical texts a hundred years ago, namely the ending of a century. Since Huntington's theory also comes at the end of our century it is interesting to examine whether this factor (*fin-de-siècle*) also has had an impact on Huntington's theory.

2.4 Fin De Siècle

In this chapter as in the previous chapters, geopolitical history is used in order to examine the construction of Huntington's theory. The main aim of this chapter is to examine whether a particular phenomenon that effected geopolitical texts a hundred years ago has had a similar impact on Huntington's theory. In other words, by comparing and discussing the relevance of *fin-de-siècle*⁹ mentality on geopolitical ideas of the 1890's and on Huntington's geopolitical ideas, from the 1990's, I would like to answer the question: is the development of a geopolitical text affected by the *fin-de-siècle* mentality of its time?

First of all, why does the turning of this century carry particular historical significance? Even though history does not fall easily into hundred-year blocks, the human preoccupation with measurement of time, has inevitably resulted in a fascination with a passing of a century. At such a point in time there are many examples of "wistful reflection on the past as well as intense speculation about the future." (Atkinson and Dodds, 2000, p. 31). At these 'end of century', man made junctures, there is enough evidence to show that historical events or changes tend to acquire more attention and extra layers of meaning. It is this heightened focus, at the end of a century, that can be referred to as the *fin-de-siècle* mentality.

The chapter is divided in to two main parts. In the first part I examine the effects the *fin-de-siècle* mentality might have had on geopolitical texts of the nineteenth century. The second part concerns the twentieth century *fin-de-siècle* mentality, especially with regards to the influence on Huntington's ideas.

End of the Nineteenth century

Following is a brief description of factors that contributed to the nineteenth century *fin-de-siècle* mentality. At the end of the nineteenth century, the world was witnessing a transition from an older industrial economy dependent upon steam, coal and iron to a more effect

⁹The French expression, *Fin-de-siècle*, translated simply means 'end of century'.

industry which was based on gas, oil and electricity. This change seems to have altered, not only the time-space compression, but also the ground rules by which the world economy functioned. The position of the global economic hegemony was no longer filled by Britain. America was the new nation that would dominate economically. By the eve of the First World War, America claimed one-third of the world's industrial production, like Britain 40 years earlier.

There were also comparable transformations in the global political order. The old relationship between space and state politics that the European world order traditionally had been based on was now challenged by the US, which unlike the smaller European states was a continental-scale land power. Europe on the other hand was made up of relatively small competing states that were hardly tied together by a fragile maritime trade. In light of the success of the US, many believed that the future would be dominated by three or four spatially extensive land confederations (comparable to the USA), which would emerge in Asia, Africa and Europe itself (Atkinson and Dodds, 2000).

Along the same lines, the economic atmosphere also saw an upsurge in economic nationalism and a general clamour for tariff reform and protectionism. This protectionism trend, was due to the success of the USA as an economically self-sufficient geopolitical unit. Even though economic autarky flew in the face of the well cherished ideal of free trade, there was a growing conviction that "the future would be dominated by large, spatially cohesive and economically self-sufficient geopolitical units." (Atkinson and Dodds, 2000, p. 29). This trend is exemplified by Bismarck's protectionist policy at the time, the French Méline tariff of 1892, and Joseph Chamberlain's ill-fated campaign for imperial reform in order to make the British imperial system more profitable. (Atkinson and Dodds, 2000, p. 29).

Another important development of the time was the growing fear among Europeans that geographical size would determine power. Partly because of this fear, "the principle imperial powers embarked on an unprecedented 'scramble' for imperial space from the 1880's onwards." (Atkinson and Dodds, 2000, p. 29). Heffernan¹⁰ rightly argues, that this last imperial rush for more land, was an attempt by the small European states in the hope that this would maintain their survival in the coming world order. "No self-respecting power could be

¹⁰ Michael Heffernan, one of the contributors to David Atkinson and Klaus Dodds book, *Geopolitical Traditions; a century of geopolitical thought*.

without its 'place in the sun'." (Atkinson and Dodds, 2000, p. 29). What is interesting to note and which is relevant to the discussion concerning the portrayal of the history of American foreign policy, is that the United States, the 'anti-colonialist' power, which had by far enough domestic space, joined in this desperate imperial expansion, acquiring Puerto Rico, Cuba and the Philippines after the Spanish-American war of 1898.

No matter how optimistic, most of the different colonial systems did not become profitable, and soon the competition that went on between the European states on the colonial arena, returned back to the European continent. As a part of this ongoing interconnected development, the European inter-state system underwent a fundamental transformation from the 1890's. Europe was no longer arranged in a complex web of bi-lateral treaties and pacts; instead a more dangerous bi-polar arrangement soon developed: "While the former was by no means peaceful, the latter ensured that an otherwise containable war would escalate into the kind of general European conflagration that engulfed the continent in August 1914." (Atkinson and Dodds, 2000, p. 30).

The Effects of Nineteenth Century *fin-de-siècle* Mentality on Geopolitical Ideas

It was in this changing political and economic environment that the new 'science' of geopolitics arose. 'Geopolitics' was the new kind of study for a new century.

How did the geopolitical texts at this time reflect the *fin-de-siècle* mentality?

The geopolitical texts written at this time give a good indicator of the different attitudes concerning the future. Most of the geopolitical texts were pessimistic in nature and believed that the passing of the nineteenth century would represent a fundamental historical discontinuity. Geoffrey Parker highlights this in his book, *Geopolitics; Past, Present and Future*. "It appeared to Kjellén¹¹, and to many others at the time, that the established order which had existed throughout the greater part of the nineteenth century, and which had underpinned the great advances of the time, was breaking down." (Parker, 1998, p. 12). This pessimistic outlook of the future is part of the motivation behind Kjellen's geopolitical ideas, believes Parker. "Kjellén himself shared the pervasive feelings of gloom which nurtured such ideas, and his political views were to a large extent a product of them." (Parker, 1998, p. 13).

¹¹ Rudolf Kjellen: Swedish political scientist who coined the term 'geopolitics'.

Another important *fin-de-siècle* trait reflected in the geopolitical texts was the heightened focus on understanding the world in its entirety. This focus on understanding the world as an integrated whole was due to the fast advancement of technology, especially transportation and communication, which made the world shrink. Again Kjellen's geopolitics can be used as an example of this trend of seeing the world as a closed system.

In his geopolitics, Kjellén made a distinction between what he termed 'proper' and 'special' geopolitics. 'Proper' geopolitics is concerned with the spatial attributes of the state, while 'special' geopolitics is concerned with the state as part of the larger system. According to Parker, "'Special' geopolitics thus placed the state in the wider context, and the relationships among states constituted an essential part of the understanding both of the state itself and the workings of the system as a whole." (Parker, 1998, p. 18).

There were some optimistic voices concerning the future consequences of these technological, political and economic innovations. But on the whole, pessimism was the dominant mood of the *fin-de-siècle* mentality. At this time, most did not see rapid change as energizing and liberating, rather they saw these changes as producing dislocation and disorientation, which would eventually result in the destruction of cherished traditions and values.

The fate of Europe was especially focused on in the debate between the optimists and the pessimists. The optimists had no problem in picturing Europe (maybe united) as still having a central position in the new world order. The pessimists, on the other hand, believed that the European hegemony would be undermined and ultimately decline because of the rise of very different empires. These new empires could be found both to the West and the East. In the West, "the USA seemed destined to dominate the entire American land mass, north and south, and perhaps also the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean." (Atkinson, Dodds, 2000. p. 32). To the East, it was believed that "an Asiatic power arising from the ashes of the still quasi-feudal empires of Russia or Japan." (Atkinson, Dodds, 2000. p. 32).

To sum up, I believe that it is legitimate to conclude that the heightened pessimistic feeling that can be detected at the end of the nineteenth century, as we have seen, did have an effect on certain geopolitical ideas of the 1890's.

End of the Twentieth Century

Now, hundred years later, how did the ending of the last century effect geopolitical thinking? According to the view of 'critical' geopolitics¹², the post-Cold War world presented itself as a much more complicated and intricate place after the Fall of the Berlin Wall. The 'Critical geopolitician', Ó Tuathail, sees a new round of the 'time-space compression' taking place, resulting in an even stronger feeling of interconnectedness. He argues that the newly proliferating forms of communication and media that are so characteristic of our present time, has swamped everyday life:

...with an abundance of mediated realities,...The intensity and speed of the political, economic, and cultural transformations wrought by a globally organized, flexible accumulation threaten to overwhelm the ability of intellectuals to assimilate them (Ó Tuathail, 1996, p. 226).

In this new world (dis)order, the old geopolitical 'experts' of the Cold War, were desperately "seeking to delimit and define a map of that world order in ways that serve existing power structures and systems of authority." (Dalby, Routledge and Ó Tuathail, 1998, p. 111). Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former colleague and coauthor of Huntington, also experienced the end of the twentieth century as uncertain. The title of his book, *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century*, reflects this feeling of uncertainty.

Geopolitical reactions to the feeling that the world is shrinking, was both a phenomenon in the 1890's and the 1990's. According to Agnew, the late nineteenth century geopolitical models "helped to stabilize the sense of a shrinking world in which rapid change was the order of the day." (Agnew, 1998, p. 26). Ó Tuathail, sees a similar reaction to the 'time-space compression' in geopolitical texts today:

A century later, a series of new congealments of geography and governmentality are emerging amid an even more intense round of time-space compression, a *fin de* millennium vertigo of informationalization and globalization that is remaking global space and creating new

¹² 'Critical' Geopolitics applies social scientific critical thinking to ask how power works and might be challenged. This school views the following as central to geopolitical studies: analysis of discourse, rhetoric, metaphors, and symbolism.

conditions of possibility for its representation by systems of authority (Ó Tuathail, 1996, p. 249).

What happens within the Western foreign policy community under these circumstances of disorientation and vertigo, as Ó Tuathail calls them? He believes that the traditional geopolitics which previously "...enframed the world within modern Western categories and conceptions" (Ó Tuathail, 1996, p. 227) went through a crisis at the end of the century. In the new postmodern world it was increasingly difficult to represent the global world along the lines of a geopolitical 'grand narrative'. However, despite these fundamental changes, Ó Tuathail points out, that the neoconservative Western foreign policy community continue to fashion the world along the same old geopolitical conceptions of the world order.

Huntington's theory is a good example of the attempt to refashion the world back into the safe and familiar geopolitical dualistic concepts that represented the Cold War.

One can clearly sense the anxiety due the "condition of postmodernity" in Huntington's text.

Huntington's response to this unhappy and disorderly world is to "return to the imaginary fundamentals of earlier history and recycle them in the hope of reterritorializing global space in such a way that his neoconservative agenda of cultural and ideological was against those who challenge Western fundamentalism (its national security state and society of security) becomes the only option." (Ó Tuathail, 1996, p. 249).

The Effect of Twentieth Century *fin-de-siècle* Mentality on Huntington's Geopolitical Ideas

Can Huntington's theory be seen as a result of our post-modern millennialism?

When Heffernan examines Mackinder in relation to the *fin-de-siècle* mentality of the 1890's, he believes that Mackinder's writing can be understood "as nervous commentaries on Europe's uncertain fate in the changing conditions of the twentieth century." (Atkinson, Dodds, 2000, p. 47). Similarly, this way of understanding a geopolitical text can be applied to Huntington's theory. Is it possible to claim that the reason why Huntington developed his civilizational theory was because of the 'uncertain' and 'undefined' world that appeared at the end of the

century, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet empire. A few years before Huntington published his theory, he claimed that "the world changed in 1990,...and so did strategic discourse." (Dalby, Ó Tuathail, Routledge, 1998, p. 171). He also remarked "This emerging world is likely to lack the clarity and stability of the Cold War and to be a more jungle-like world of multiple dangers, hidden traps, unpleasant surprises and moral ambiguities." (Dalby, Tuathail, Routledge, 1998, p. 171).

Huntington's view of the new world (dis)order, does not leave much room for optimism:

The West's victory in the Cold War has produced not triumph but exhaustion. The West is increasingly concerned with its internal problems and needs, as it confronts slow economic growth, stagnating populations, unemployment, huge government deficits, a declining work ethic, low savings rates, and in many countries including the United States social disintegration, drugs, and crime. Economic power is rapidly shifting to East Asia, and military power and political influence are starting to follow. India is on the verge of economic takeoff and the Islamic world is increasingly hostile towards the west (Huntington, 1996, p. 82).

The fear of loss of power, which the Europeans had at the end of the nineteenth century because of changes taking place, can also be detected in geopolitical texts at the end of the twentieth century. The classic example of this trend is Paul Kennedy's famous *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, from 1987. Just as Kennedy is preoccupied with the fall of the United States, so is Huntington preoccupied with not only the fall of the United States but also the decline of the Western civilization.

The topic of declining empires is one of the central topics that Huntington discusses in his book. *The fading of the West; Power, Culture and Indigenization*, is the title of one of his chapters, in which he elaborates over the declining process of the West. According to Huntington the most significant change of the new world order that threatens Western civilization, is the heightened cultural awareness among the other civilizations (especially the Islamic civilization). In this new 'civilizational global order' it is vital for the Western world (United States) to reassert their 'unique western culture' in order to survive as the dominant empire in the future. Reasserting our western values is essential, Huntington says because

What happens within a civilization is as crucial to its ability to resist destruction from external sources as it is to holding off decay from within.... Can the West renew itself or will sustained internal rot simply accelerate its end and/or subordination to other economically and demographically more dynamic civilizations? (Huntington, 1996, p. 303)

The issue of economic nationalism versus free trade at the end of the nineteenth century is also reflected in Huntington's theory a hundred years later. Discussing the successful economic development in Asia, Huntington is concerned, and does not believe that commercial networks would insure peace and harmony among nations. "Economic growth creates political instability within countries and between countries, altering the balance of power among countries and regions. Economic exchange brings people into contact; it does not bring them into agreement." (Huntington, 1996, p. 218). Huntington's advice to counter these changes, which can cause the decline of the Western civilization, is to maintain

...the United States as the premier global power, which means countering the Japanese economic challenge; preventing the emergence of a political-military hegemonic power in Eurasia; and protecting concrete American interests in the Persian Gulf and Middle America (Ó Tuathail, 1996, p. 242).

Huntington's observations of a heightened cultural awareness of the other non-western civilizations and the political, economic and cultural consequences of this, may or may not be correct. The question is, are these changes viewed more negatively or "acquire extra layers of meaning" (Atkinson, Dodds, 2000, p. 31) because of a heightened awareness of decline that comes with the closing of a century?

Just as Geoffrey Praker reads Kjellén's geopolitical ideas as evidence of a pessimistic feeling of a political situation at the time, I believe that Huntington's theory reflects a pessimistic feeling of the future of the West at the end of this century.

Conclusion

Having examined Huntington's theory in the light of the *fin-de-siècle* mentality, it seems only fair to presume that while the new world order after the collapse of the Soviet empire was the main factor, Huntington's ideas have also been affected by the ending of a century.

Comparing the two different epochs is rewarding because the geopolitical reactions in the 1890's is quite similar to the geopolitical reactions of the 1990's. These similarities, of course, can be due to other factors than just a reaction to the ending of a century. As shown in the previous chapters, many of the old western geopolitical conceptions of the global world order can be easily traced to Huntington's theory. Because Huntington's conception of the global world is build upon many of the classical western geopolitical perceptions, it is natural to connect many similar reactions to historical changes, sometimes accentuated because they happened at the turn of a century.

In conclusion then, examining Huntington's ideas with regards to the fin-de-siecle mentality of the 1990's, has provided one piece of the Huntington puzzle.

In the next section, the notion that Huntington's theory could be understood as a theory concerning the American identity rather than a coming clash of civilizations, will be examined further in order to substansiate this claim. This involves analyzing the theory within its contemporary political context.

Part 3: Huntington's Theory and the American Identity

3.1 Huntington's theory, a reaction to postmodernity?

In chapter 2.3 *The 'Other' in Geopolitics*, we saw that the concept of the 'Other' plays an important role when it comes to identity formation. It was also postulated that Huntington's theory instead of being about a threatening 'Other', could rather be viewed as a theory that concerns the preservation of the American 'Self'. If the concept of the 'Other' is needed to police the 'Self', then the question is, what according to Huntington is threatening the American identity? In order to shed more light on this topic it is relevant to examine the American identity both in a historical perspective and in a contemporary perspective.

In this chapter I will discuss whether Huntington's theory can be seen as an attempt to protect the classical concept of the American identity from the effects of our new postmodern and globalized world.

It is important to note that a great deal of the literature on this topic has a postmodern theoretical basis. Therefore, inevitably it will be necessary to include a postmodernist critique, when examining Huntington's theory in its contemporary post-Cold War setting.

Postmodernity and Postmodernism

I will briefly define the terms, postmodernity and postmodernism. There is a clear distinction between postmodernity and postmodernism. Simply put, postmodernism can be understood as an intellectual movement in social thought and as cultural criticism of modernism, while postmodernity, on the other hand, has more to do with our everyday lives. Postmodernity, among many things, involves cultural differentiation and complexity, the loss of authority of high culture, and the growth of urban multiculturalism as a consequence of the process of globalization.

Postmodernism is a word which is not easily explained (and that itself is postmodern). When looking up the word in *The American Heritage Dictionary* from 1983, there was no mention of either postmodernity or postmodernism. The word 'post' prefixed to 'modern' implies that it isn't modern anymore. According to Richard Appignanesi and Chris Garratt, in their book, *Introducing Postmodernism*,

Postmodernism is a confusion of meanings stemming from two riddles...

- it resists and obscures the sense of modernism

- it implies a complete knowledge of the modern which has been surpassed by a new age

(Appignanesi, Garratt, 1999, p.4)

Even though the term postmodernism first appeared in the late 1960's, it was not until Charles Jencks's book *'The language of Post-Modern Architecture'* (1975) that postmodernism acquired a widespread currency. In Jencks own words:

Post-Modern space is historically specific, rooted in conventions, unlimited or ambiguous in zoning and 'irrational' or transformational in its relation of parts to whole. The boundaries are often left unclear, the space extended infinitely without apparent edge (Sim, 1998).

In the 1980's, the term 'postmodernism' was used by many disciplines, but came to mean different things, which in itself was postmodern. Postmodernism came to represent a rejection of many of the cultural certainties on which life in the West had been structured over the last couple of centuries. In this new postmodern world, there was a sense of loss of unity and of synthesis. Words such as discontinuity, fragmentation, irrationality and volatility were words used to describe this new feeling, which rejected or transcended all that was 'modern'.

The characteristics of this new age are many and span an enormous area. The erosion of the distinction between high and low culture is a classic example. As postmodern cultural pluralism became stronger, the privileged elitist claims of regarding high culture to be the criterion of aesthetic supremacy dwindled. In the art world, there were clear signs of this erosion. As early as 1917, Marcel Duchamp, shocked his peers by exhibiting a porcelain male urinal under the title 'Fountain'. The postmodern thought implied that popular culture was as good as tradition. Coca Cola, mass media, Madonna, McDonalds, could no longer be ignored as a very influential part of society.

Our postmodern social condition can be described with terms such as "...informational technologies, globalization, fragmentation of lifestyles, hyper-consumerism, deregulation of financial markets and public utilities, the obsolescence of the nation-state, and social experimentation with the traditional life-course." (Turner, 1994, pp. 14-15). In other words, a postmodern society is a pluralistic society. The term 'multiculturalism' is what best describes most of the powerful capitals in this world. Globalization and technology have made the notion of 'national culture' problematic. In our decreasing world, difference and otherness has taken center stage.

Before moving on, I would like to point out the connection between postmodernism as a philosophical critique and the postmodern social condition that surrounds us. One can ask the question, had postmodernity existed if communism had not fallen? These two conditions are inextricably connected. In 1989 after the Berlin Wall came tumbling down, communism was regarded as an obsolete ideology. What implications did this have for liberal democracy? Many of course saw this as a triumph, 'the end of history', victory to the liberal democratic capitalistic way of life. Or could it mean, according to postmodern thought, the end of grand narratives, the end of ideologies?

After the fall of the Soviet Empire, western military power and global capitalism no longer had a powerful antagonist. Many postmodern critics believe that this postmodern condition has resulted in a feeling of 'disorientation' and 'uncertainty' among many conservative intellectuals in the West and has led to a form of nostalgic reaction where old conceptions and categories are recycled in order to reorganize the new conditions of the global order into the old familiar 'modern' conceptual framework. It is within the western foreign policy community that this experience of 'disorientation' is especially prominent.

As we know, the end of the Cold War caused a crisis in the academic field of international relations. After the 'stable' condition, that the Cold War represented, it was not strange that many experienced this new era as disorienting and unstable. (see chapter 2.4 *Fin-De-Siècle*) As the Berlin Wall came down so did apparently also the 'realistic' political theory of the Cold War. There was now a surge to develop a new all-encompassing 'script' under which to organize and guide politics. In the beginning all kinds of scripts were based on all kinds of different threats, like global environmental issues, international drugs trafficking, the rise of

religious fundamentalism, etc. The difficulty however, was that there were too many of them and not one script predominated.

This feeling of 'disorientation' had important implications also for geopolitics after the Cold War. As I have discussed in part two, geopolitics, as a form of Cartesian perspectivalism, has always been constructed along modern western categories and conceptions. To construct geopolitics along these modern categories is becoming more and more difficult, according to postmodern critics, as they clash with postmodernity.

Huntington's Theory and Postmodernity

As I have mentioned before, Huntington's theory is an attempt to provide the world with a new all-encompassing world theory. The question is, whether his theory is a diagnosis or is it rather a reaction or a symptom of our postmodern time: Is it possible to detect in his text this feeling of 'disorientation' and 'dislocation' that many postmodern critics believe characterize many conservative intellectuals of this time?

I find that, it is possible to detect this feeling of 'disorientation' and 'dislocation', all the way through his book. This feeling becomes evident within his discussion on the effects of globalization on non-western cultures.

Defining Globalization

There are many interpretations of the effects of globalization or what Huntington calls 'westernization' and 'modernization'.¹³ The most common approach is to understand the

¹³ I would like to point out Huntington's use and distinction between 'westernization' and 'modernization'. Huntington unlike many does not believe that 'westernization' is a necessary condition for 'modernization'. He says, "For the first time in history global politics is both multipolar and multicivilizational; modernization is distinct from Westernization and is producing neither a universal civilization in any meaningful sense nor the Westernization of non-western societies." In other words, it is not that Huntington denies the interaction between different cultures occur, they do, but only in terms of acquiring different 'techniques' or 'inventions'. He says, "...the increased interaction among modern societies may not generate a common culture but it does facilitate the transfer of techniques, inventions, and practices from one society to another with a speed and to a degree that were impossible in the traditional world." (Huntington, 1996)

present condition of globalization as a process that will result in a 'global culture', which will reflect the image of the dominant economic paradigm of global capitalism.

Postmodernists, on the other hand, take a different view. As far as I have understood, both the local and global carries on as a result of globalization, according to postmodern thought. As an increased and heightened interaction between different cultures occur, a global civilization develops. But also as a parallel and seemingly contradictory occurrence, local cultures are also strengthened and develop as a result of globalization.

Huntington's interpretation on the other hand, does not see a 'global civilization' developing as a result of the effects of globalization. Local cultures, on the other hand, will grow stronger, but unlike postmodern interpretation, they are not changed or influenced by globalization. Their strength comes from the reaction against globalization, according to Huntington. In order to withstand foreign outside influence, he finds that we are witnessing a resurgence of 'traditional' cultural values within non-western cultures. He supports his claims on Robertson's globalization theory, thus:

From sociology, globalization theory produces a similar conclusion: 'in an increasingly globalized world – characterized by historically exceptional degrees of civilizational, societal and other modes of interdependence and widespread consciousness thereof – there is an exacerbation of civilizational, societal and ethnic self-consciousness.' The global religious revival, 'the return to the sacred,' is a response to people's perception of the world as 'a single place' (Huntington, 1996, p. 68).

This point of view is far from undisputed within academic circles. In a discussion on the impact of globalization on religious faith, Bryan S. Turner takes a completely different view of the effects of globalization, in particular what many refer to as low culture. He says:

What makes religious faith or religious commitment problematic in a globalized postmodern society is that everyday life has become part of a global system of exchange of commodities which are not easily influenced by political leaders, intellectuals or religious leaders. The corruption of pristine faith is going to be brought about by Tina Turner and Coca-Cola and not

by rational arguments and rational inspection of presuppositions and the understanding of Western secularism (Turner, 1994, p. 10).

Turner believes that many academics and intellectuals are wrong when they underestimate the effect of the spread of low culture on the various cultures around the world.

Turner believes that globalization brings about cultural change, not just in non-western cultures, but also in western cultures. He says, "Globalization brings about increasing diversification and complexity of cultures by interposing a variety of traditions within a given community." (Turner, 1994, p. 184).

Huntington argues vigilantly against this point of view, he says, "The argument now that the spread of pop culture and consumer goods around the world represents the triumph of Western civilization trivializes Western culture. The essence of Western civilization is the Magna Carta not the Magna Mac. The fact that non-Westerners may bite into the latter has no implications for their accepting the former." (Huntington, 1996, p. 58). Putting his argument in even more blatant terms, he states that globalization "...has no implication for their (non-westerners) attitudes towards the west. Somewhere in the Middle East a half-dozen young men could well be dressed in jeans, drinking Coke, listening to rap, and, between their bows to Mecca, putting together a bomb to blow up an American airliner." (Huntington, 1996, p. 58).

Huntington's rhetoric, when describing the effects of globalization on Muslim culture, reflects less understanding of the 'Other' culture than anxiety about it. As I discussed in part two, these oversimplifications helped to reduce geographical specificity of conflicts. They can also be interpreted as a feeling of 'disorientation'.

If we examine his interpretation of the effects of globalization on Western culture (and specifically American culture), we see that the feeling of 'disorientation' (postmodern anxiety) becomes even more apparent. It furthermore seems that Huntington is not really concerned with the threat from the Muslim 'Other' at all, but that his real worry is rather the intellectual and political clash that he sees threatening within the United States. I will return to this claim in chapter 4.1, *Huntington's Theory versus Huntington's Realism*.

An indication of this concern is his extremely pessimistic interpretation of the future of western civilization, and especially his view of the domestic situation of the United States. Huntington takes a completely different view of the effects of globalization on Western civilization than on non-western cultures. While other cultures are growing strong because of resistance to foreign 'influence', the western culture, on the other hand, is eroding due to globalizational forces, whether they be 'foreign' influence or 'internal' influence.

Western culture is eroding, according to Huntington, because of non-western immigrants, the politics of multiculturalists and the economics of globalization. In other words, Huntington implies that globalization has the effect of heightening local cultural awareness of non-western cultures, but has the opposite effect on the western culture! He does not explain why the West should be more susceptible to cultural change than other cultures? Whether western societies are less preoccupied with policing their various national cultures from outside influence is open to question. Huntington's theory itself is a brilliant example of the intense preoccupation the West has always had of 'protecting' their society from cultural degradation from outside influence. He finds that Western culture is eroding due to globalizational forces and that non-western cultures are strengthening their traditional, specific culture due to globalizational forces. It can easily be understood as inspired by a feeling of uncertainty when his descriptions on the effects on Western society sounds like demagogic rhetoric aimed at scaring the American population into a sense of national unity.

As I have already discussed previously in my thesis, Huntington clearly generalizes and simplifies the immigrant situation in the United States. Without any further argumentation, he states, that the large minority group of Hispanics in the United States are not 'assimilating'(!)¹⁴, and his conclusion is; "If assimilation fails in this case, the United States will become a cleft country, with all the potentials for internal strife and disunion that entails." (Huntington, 1996, p. 305). His concern is even more apparent when he discusses 'multiculturalism'. He sees the multiculturalists as a danger because their politics undermine the Western cultural heritage and are contributing to "...the de-Westernization of the United States". (Huntington, 1996).

¹⁴ This statement can of course be debated, but this is not really relevant to this discussion.

He warns that, "In the name of multiculturalism they (intellectuals, publicists) have attacked the identification of the United States with Western civilization, denied the existence of a common American culture, and promoted racial, ethnic, and other subnational cultural identities and groupings." (Huntington, 1996, p. 305). The consequences of promoting these ideas would lead to a United States lacking a cultural core and "History shows that no country so constituted can long endure as a coherent society. A multicivilizational United States will not be the United States; it will be the United Nations." (Huntington, 1996, p. 306).

Huntington finds that, it is hard if not impossible to combine American political ideology with non-western culture and "the rights of groups , defined largely in terms of race, ethnicity, sex, and sexual preference" (Huntington, 1996, p. 306) because he claims these peoples or groups disavow the American ideology (Creed). Using the old Domino metaphor from the Cold War era, Huntington says that

...liberalism will be the next domino to fall". "In an era in which peoples everywhere define themselves in cultural terms what place is there for a society without a cultural core and defined only by a political creed? Political principles are a fickle base on which to build a lasting community. In a multicivilizational world where culture counts, the United States could be simply the last anomalous holdover from a fading Western world where ideology counted (Huntington, 1996, p. 306).

The other aspect of the western political environment that Huntington, is critical of is economic globalization, or if you will, the promotion of liberal economic capitalism around the world. Most would see global capitalism as a positive instrument in favour of U.S. hegemony, but Huntington disagrees.

Huntington is concerned with the growing unpatriotic development within the American business community. He accuses them of posing a threat to America's 'national unity' and 'cultural integrity' because they do not necessarily conduct their business in favour of national strategic interests (Aysha, 2003).

Economic globalization or the closely related concept of 'Western Universalism' is a threat to the security of Western civilization, according to Huntington. "What is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest." (Huntington, 1996, p. 184). Huntington points out that it is

dangerous that the West, and especially the United States promotes a universal Western culture because there is a gap between Western principle and Western action. "Double standards in practice are the unavoidable price of universal standard of principle." (Huntington, 1996, p. 184).

This aspect of Huntington's theory is most times then not, ignored by many of his critics because it is not consistent with the rest of his theory. However, as we shall see this aspect is a crucial piece of the Huntington puzzle.

Before moving on to the conclusion, I would like to suggest another interesting comparison, that possibly might also see Huntington's theory as a reaction to postmodernity. Is it interesting to compare Huntington's reaction to the postmodern condition of our western societies, to Islamic fundamentalist reaction to globalization?

In my view, it is not unreasonable to compare Huntington's reaction to postmodernity to the fundamentalist reaction that can be found within the Muslim population. Of course, this comparison has its limits. It nevertheless, highlights some essential elements within Huntington's theory. Both Islamic fundamentalism and Huntington reacts negatively towards the effects of globalism. As Bamyeh says, "...Jihad epitomizes reversion to local traditions and local history and a determined resistance to globalism on culturalist rather than economic ground." (Bamyeh, 2000, p. 80). In a similar fashion, Huntington advocates that the state needs to be protected from forces which are fuelled by globalization. He wants to protect America's cultural and ideological heritage, in other words "...maintain America's own domestic geopolitics of identity." (Aysha, 2003).

Conclusion

In my opinion Huntington's strong warnings about non-western immigrants that do not assimilate, multiculturalism and economic globalism, supports the view that his theory must be understood more as a reaction against, than as a diagnosis of, the conditions of our 'postmodern' world.

As mentioned earlier, postmodernity does not only present new cultural contexts around the world, but is also transforming the nature of intellectual work. This change has evoked a nostalgic reaction among many intellectuals, especially within the social sciences. This 'nostalgia' is clearly evident in Huntington's theory. As I have shown earlier, Huntington allows no room for low culture having any sort of impact or role when it comes to influencing fundamental cultural characteristics within a society. Huntington's attention is always on a 'higher' level, be it on political or intellectual leaders or with 'all encompassing' terms such as 'religion', 'culture', and 'civilization'. In other words, Huntington is not only trying to provide a new geopolitical world map, which tries to counteract the consequences of globalization where local and global cultures are mixed in a new melting pot of multiculturalism, but at the same time he is also acting as a guardian of high culture, trying to counteract the postmodern condition where high and low culture is regarded significantly equal. In the end then, his ideas reflect a nostalgic relationship to the past and his critique of the different conditions of postmodernity signals an 'uncertain' reaction to the changes taking place.

However, the essential element in this chapter is Huntington's concern about the American identity. Could it be that his theory is in actual fact more about the preservation of the American 'Self' than about a coming clash of civilizations? If this is so then what purpose does Huntington's world order theory serve? Is there a connection between policing the 'Self' and a nation's foreign policy? In the next chapter this claim will be examined further.

3.2 Huntington's theory, a discourse of danger?

As mentioned above this chapter will examine whether there is a significant connection between policing the American identity and American foreign policy. In this discussion I have made use of a theory, which has been put forward by David Campbell. In his book, *Writing Security*, Campbell discusses how the shaping of the American identity, through history, is closely tied not only to the concept of the 'Other', but also to the nation's foreign policy.

Even though Campbell does not discuss Huntington's theory, I believe that applying Campbell's theory to Huntington's thesis, is significant when discussing whether Huntington's theory tells us more about the domestic political situation in the United States than it does about a coming clash of civilizations.

In western geopolitical history we have seen how certain ideas and concepts travel down through time and are incorporated into new discursive space. Even though historical conditions change it is interesting to see how these older 'ideas' essentially remain the same. Campbell's theory is especially significant because he focuses specifically on how American security and identity policy has developed as a result of their unique history. One thing is to place Huntington's theory within Western international geopolitical history, another is to place his theory within American security and identity history. In order to present a reasonable discussion, a short summary of Campbell's theory is needed.

Campbell's theory

David Campbell's '*Writing Security*' (Campbell, 1998) is regarded as a new example of historicism in international relations. Especially concentrating on American foreign policy, Campbell places security at the heart of identity politics. Going through American political and cultural history, Campbell is keen to show how the United States foreign policy has represented the 'Other' as a way of creating and controlling American identity. Campbell argues that 'possible' threats are made to seem more realistic than they really are in order to maintain a consensus about security. The establishment of stable 'foreign' threats becomes a permanent part of the cultural terrain. Outside threats have the effect, on the community at

risk, of enforcing their normative boundaries. In this way, it is possible to see identity being constituted in opposition to 'foreign' threats. Campbell's approach to security can be seen as anti-foundational, meaning that foreign threats are not really concrete threats at all. According to Campbell, most threats are never real in the sense that they pose a threat in terms of traditional calculations of military power. Therefore, security policies are in reality based on the imagination, interpretation, and rituals of inclusion and exclusions.

According to Campbell, America since its birth has regarded itself in moralistic opposition to everything that was not right. America was the land of the free and would forever be the guardians of what they believed to be the universal correct way of life. Starting with the 'discovery' of America, Campbell shows how history is conveniently selected and interpreted to best suit the image we would like to have of America.

Take for example, the 'discovery' of America, Campbell challenges this notion, instead he claims that we should see America as being 'invented' rather than 'discovered'.

'In 1492, when Colombus sailed the ocean blue', he set out to discover the eastern shores of Asia, not a new continent. That there existed an other continent went against the prevailing conceptions of how the earth worked. From 1492 and 1504, Colombus managed to make four voyages, each time he was convinced he had reached Asia, even though the geographical signs opposed his conviction. With the theological authority backing him, Colombus engaged in a variety of strategies, in order to place the different evidence he encountered into the preexisting conception of the earth.

According to Edmundo O'Gorman, America was "an act of invention rather than discovery" (Campbell, 1998, p. 93). Colombus never believed he had discovered anything else but Asia, because conventional wisdom at the time denied the existence of a new continent. It was Vespucci, not Colombus, who gave America a space on the world map. Vespucci, concluded that there was a possibility that there existed a different landmass. He referred to this new landmass, as *novus mundus* (new world). In 1507, the term America appeared for the first time in a text to describe the newly encountered lands. The term America is taken from Vespucci's Christian name. So finally, fifteen years after Colombus set sail for Asia, America was conceived, inscribed, and gendered as a new and separate landmass.

The emergence of America into world history, is better understood as a product of the transistion between the medieval and the modern age. At the time, tradition was being overtaken by a modern frame of reference. The notion of the existence of a land called America helped to undermine the boundaries of the 'cosmic jail' constructed by the Roman Church. At the time Copernicus was also shifting the heavens, and other discoveries were taking place which guided the way to a new modern era. That America appeared in Western history at this time as the land of opportunities, and the land of promise and freedom, is not a coincidence. "It was the interpretive opportunity provided by the struggle between intellectual freedom and traditional authority that made America possible in the first instance." (Campbell, 1998, p.96).

The other important aspect of the invention of America, which Campbell points out, is the notion of historical erasure in understanding American identity. By removing part of history, the conventional understanding of America's origins, conveying Colombus as 'discovering' America, has given rise to an interpretation of mythic proportions about the origins of the modern nation. Campbell believes that the priority given to spatial conceptions over temporal processes is a recurring trend in the understanding of the American identity. Just as with the 'discovery' of America, the development of the American identity by the first Puritan settlers was also a case of traditional modes of representation struggling to make sense of all the new encounters they made in the new world. In understanding modern American identity, it is important to realize the lasting significance of the confrontation between the 'Self' and the 'Other' in the new world.

The Settlers

Several factors contributed to the development of the Colonial identity. Even though the Puritans were not the only European settlers to North America, they provided the ideological justifications required for long-term colonization. To them the new land, provided them with the place in which they could complete the work of the Reformation. The colonization of America came to be regarded as the fulfillment of scriptural prophecy and the subsequent American self was the product of divine intent. In this way, the Puritans provided a powerful 'myth of America' (Campbell, 1998, p.107).

Since America was now regarded as the 'new Eden', people or objects encountered which stood in the way of the destiny of the 'new chosen people', were regarded as a threat. The way the Puritan society in America treated its surroundings, reflects the fragility of their identity. Even people within the homogenous society that breached the codes of the community, were considered to pose a serious threat. However, it was what lay without that caused the greater anxiety. So long as the settlers identity was not secure, a clear distinction between themselves and the American Indians was drawn.

In their new and foreign surroundings, the English placed great effort in idealizing what it was to be English. In this way differentiation was highlighted, keeping the alleged paganism and barbarity of the indigenous people as a constant reminder of what colonists would become if difference inside and out were not confined, contained, and controlled. Even though the American Indians served as the 'other' for a long time, eventually attitudes changed and they were no longer regarded as a threat to the English identity. But this did not imply a major transformation of the colonial identity. The boundary between inside and outside, self and other, was still the way to ensure the safety of the identity.

The line between inside and outside is not fixed in stone forever. The self could easily be differentiated from other 'others'.

Another obvious 'Other', were the African slaves. They recieved even harsher discriptions than the American indians because they were literarily brought into the colonial society, because of this greater effort had to be made to inscribe the boundary that kept them outside. For instance, the Africans, unlike the American indians, were rarely referred to as 'savage' or 'pagan', terms which allowed room for the possibility of social mobility. The African slaves were simply referred to as 'negroes', 'blacks', or 'Africans'. In this shift away from the Christian/pagan distinction, the settlers started to signify their identity from 'Christian' to 'English' and 'free', and by 1680, to 'white'.

The common view among the colonial Americans, the founding fathers included, can be well summarized by the philosopher David Hume.

I am apt to suspect the Negroes and in general all the other species of men...to be naturally inferior to the whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white,

nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No indigenous manufactures among them, no arts, no sciences (Campbell, 1998, p.117).

It is interesting to note that the cultural characteristics such as religion, reason, the arts, and sciences serve as the primary point of differentiation. It is not until the nineteenth century that biological characteristics, like race and color, serve as the primary point of differentiation.¹⁵

Can the reason for this shift be due to Christianity losing its dominant force in the articulation of the European identity? Before the nineteenth century, the common Christian belief was that there was a common origin of humanity, that Indians, Africans and Europeans at one time were all descendants from the same source. Attitudes changed however, as science gained a prominent position in society. In the name of science, at that time, it was suggested that the negro might be situated on the borderline that marked off the men from the apes, in this way Africans were dehumanized.

The construction of the American nation was always in progress and dangers to the English colonial identity could always be found. Other European settlers were easily targets of suspicion, no matter how much they might share in common with the English identity. The new settlers could be subject to a form of integration which was designed to 'anglify' them into the dominant ways of colonial America. Soon also the 'Americans', a term, which came into regular use after the revolution, came to differentiate themselves from the English. From the 1760's and onwards, the Americans had started to depict the English and their culture to be morally inferior and even decadent compared to America. The need to differentiate themselves from the English could be due to the minimal social effects of the American revolution. In essence, the revolution was more a dispute concerning administrative and political issues rather than social or cultural differences. "In consequence, this was a spatial not a temporal revolution. It was about the location of imperial power (London versus Philadelphia) rather than about qualitative dimensions of power." (Campbell, 1998, p.122).

¹⁵ This shift in focus from cultural to biological characteristics, was also pointed out in part 2: Huntington's Theory and Geopolitical History.

By differentiating themselves from the English, the American colonists were faced with the paradoxical dilemma of opposing the very core of their established identity. This contradicting development only led to aggravate, from before, the frail and 'endangered' colonial identity. According to Campbell, in this atmosphere the Americans continued to contain identity by associating domestic dissent with foreign threats.

According to Campbell, the French Revolution provided the Americans with an 'ideological' source for their identity, which would differentiate themselves from the English. The French Revolution, came to be regarded as the evidence of the universal aspiration for liberty in the face of monarchical tyranny. However, the French Revolution was also viewed as a threat to the moderation and constitutionalism of their political experiment. Among the citizens there emerged a division concerning governmental tasks. As divisions grew and factions and parties developed, accusations of foreign alliances passed from one group to the next. As Campbell points out, at that time dissent and opposition was frowned upon in politics. Politics was taken to be no more than the administration and management of a course that had been worked out and agreed upon through the Revolution. Charges of association with a foreign power, went hand in hand with domestic conflict centered around the issues of loyalty, patriotism, and identity. In this atmosphere of guilt by association with a foreign power, identity was contained. In the words of one of the 'Founding Fathers', John Adams believed that the growing domestic dissent in America would lead the way to "a return to the savage state of barbarous life." (Campbell, 1998, p.130).

In sum, by reviewing the historic construction of American identity, Campbell with persuasive arguments, paints a picture of "America as the imagined community par excellence". (Campbell, 1998, p.91). He has shown how America, in the struggle to establish its self, has integrated the practices of foreign policy into the production of American identity. At various junctures in the history of the production of the American identity, Campbell argues that, "a fictive paragon has been presented as a regulative ideal by which to make judgments." (Campbell, 1998, p.131). He believes that time and again a fictional representation of the past is being affirmed in the name of otherness and danger. For instance, modern political leaders, will use the Puritans and the 'Founding Fathers' as symbols of particular positions in contemporary controversies.

Foreign Policy

The essence of Campbell's theory is the notion that "...the boundaries of a state's identity are secured by the representation of danger integral to foreign policy." (Campbell, 1998, p.3). In other words, American identity is manifestly linked to danger (the Other). Following this line of thought Campbell conveys that

...instead of regarding foreign policy as the external view and rationalist orientation of a pre-established state, the identity of which is secure before it enters into relations with others, we can consider foreign policy as an integral part of the discourses of danger that serve to discipline the State (Campbell, 1998, p.51).

In other words, Campbell sees foreign policy as rather a form of domestic political strategy, which secures the identity or integration of the state.

Applying his analysis to the Cold War, contrary to conventional interpretation, the Cold War is interpreted as a "...struggle related to the production and reproduction of identity." (Campbell, 1998, p.169).

Just as I have shown in my investigation of the different geopolitical principles, that despite changing historical conditions these principles, more or less, remain the same and are worked into the new geopolitical discursive space. In a similar way, Campbell's analysis shows that

...the modes of representation through which the danger of communism and the Soviet Union have been interpreted replicate both the logic and the frustrations of past articulations of danger, the Cold War is an important moment in the (re)production of American identity that was not dependent on (though clearly influenced by) the Soviet Union for its character (Campbell, 1998, pp. 137-138).

A successful foreign policy is a foreign policy that helps to achieve the objectification of the 'Self' through the representation of danger. "This process of objectification is achieved through certain recurring representations and figurations; ones that are specific to the United States." (Campbell, 1998, p.72).

Because space is given privilege over time in the history of America, the history of America is effectively de-historized. According to Campbell, geography alone is not the essence of the American identity. Its identity is also ideational. By this he means that the major conflicts of the American identity, from the religious conflicts of the Puritans, through to the prominent place accorded the Pledge of Allegiance and the flag in modern elections, have symbolic qualities. According to Jean Baudrillard, America begins and ends with «space and the spirit of fiction» (Campbell, 1998, p.132). Lastly, political conflicts of seventeenth and eighteenth century America can be compared to American foreign policy today. Campbell believes that even though the conflicts of today are a far cry away from the conflicts of yesterday, similarities of the structural logic and modes of representation can be found.

Campbell's Theory Applied to Huntington's Ideas

Can Campbell's view of the connection between identity and American security policy be applied today in our increasingly multicultural and interdependent world? Campbell believes that the script of the Cold War lives on. New threats are 'discovered' in order to keep up the fear of what is different, in this way the American identity is still very much connected to foreign policy matters.

Huntington conveys the importance of containing the 'Other' in order to protect western civilization from decline! His 'Other' can be found both outside and within the western civilization.

Just as earlier discourses of danger, Huntington also exaggerates how different and dangerous the 'Other' is. In his book, Campbell gives an interesting example of how Japan was conveyed as a dangerous 'Other'. It is curious to see how Huntington ten years later still conveys a similar picture. Campbell shows how Japan was being depicted as 'buying up' America in the 1980's, even though Japan's share of total foreign assets in the U.S. remained fairly steady during the period and even lagged behind the percentage held by the Netherlands and Britain. In the media the Japanese were portrayed as villains, just like the Russians had been before them. This negative portrayal of the Japanese helped to darken American perceptions of

Japan. Here again differences were highlighted, continuing the negative defining of American identity, the Americans were everything the Japanese were not!

In his theory, it becomes clear that Huntington regards Japanese economic performance as a threat. He convinces his readers that the Japanese are conducting a strategy of economic warfare. Huntington's convictions are backed up with a couple of citations by Japanese political figures, declaring Japan the new economic superpower and the United States as a premier agrarian power. On the basis of these subjective rhetorical outbursts, Huntington advises that Americans "...would do well to take equally seriously both Japanese declarations of their goal at achieving economic dominance and the strategy they are pursuing to achieve that goal." (Huntington, 1993). For Huntington it is vital for the United States to concentrate on economic renewal, in order to effectively maintain their primacy in world affairs.¹⁶ The question is, whether Japan, as an economic power, is a real threat to the United States? In Campbell's view Japan is not so much a real threat, but is perceived as one to maintain consensus about security policy, in this way policing American identity.

Another central example of the 'Other' being portrayed in exaggerated terms in order to police the American identity is the Muslim 'Other'.¹⁷

Even though Huntington places civilizations and culture at the centre of his theory, very little can be learned about them. This is especially true of the Muslim civilization. Even though he characterizes the Muslim civilization as the biggest threat to world peace, there is surprisingly an extremely simple, one-sided and exaggerated description of the culture of the Muslim 'Other'.

Many critics have pointed out that there are too many different 'strands' of Islam that classifying all billion Muslims in the world, under one heading as Huntington does, is ludicrous. Even though many of Huntington's presented 'facts' and investigations into Muslim culture may be correct in relation to specific groupings or areas, these facts do not, however, qualify to be presented as representing/describing the entire Muslim world population.

¹⁶ For Huntington an economic renewal implies a renewal that is to be achieved not by downsizing the US military or breaking up the society of security.

¹⁷ The Muslim 'Other' has been previously discussed in chapter 2.3: The 'Other' in Geopolitics.

It is odd that Huntington does not discuss in further detail the readiness of civilizations to fight since he argues that Muslims are more prone to use violence in a conflict and that their civilization per se has a more violent character than other civilizations. This is a very serious claim which needs an extremely thorough systematic analysis and not just "occasional comments and historical references to crusades (Christian) and 'sacred wars' (Islamic)". (Senghaas, 1998, p. 72). In my opinion Huntington's lack of a detailed analysis to support this serious claim about the Muslim civilization, damages the credibility of his theory. It becomes more and more clear that his descriptions/claims of the Muslim 'Other' (and the other 'Others', for that matter) are overly simplified and exaggerated descriptions. These descriptions, seen through the light of Campbell's theory, would be understood as part of the American 'tradition' of policing the 'Self', by describing the 'Other' not only as the complete opposite of 'us' but also as a danger to 'us'.

Can Campbell's notion that foreign threats are anti-foundational undermine Huntington's theory? If Campbell is correct in assessing that most foreign threats are products of imagination, interpretation and rituals of inclusion and exclusions, then Huntington's thesis can be read as a political script which describes, protects and maintains our western/American identity.

The question that should be asked in this situation is: Do these threats, which Huntington describes, have foundation or are they anti-foundational? It is probably possible to argue both Campbell and Huntington's case strongly. In this type of situation facts usually play a minor role. In the end it could just as well boil down to which of the authors finds himself within the leading political discourse.

Threats from Within

During the Cold War, the 'war' against the dangerous 'Other' was not only conducted outside national borders, but also within the borders of the nation. Senator McCarthy and his men, were at the forefront of this 'war' which aimed to smoke out everything and everyone that could be a danger to the American identity. The result of this witch-hunt is legendary. In the

same spirit as the Cold War, Huntington not only focuses on the threats from outside, but also the threats from within that are contributing to the decline of America and eventually the decline of the West.

According to Huntington, the decay of the western civilization, is not only due to external threats, but also to internal problems. Several factors within the western civilization is contributing to what he calls problems of "moral decline, cultural suicide, and political disunity in the West." If these trends are not counteracted he fears that this could "give rise to the assertions of moral superiority by Muslims and Asians." (Huntington, 1996, p. 304).

The two biggest challenges within western society are immigrants and multiculturalists. Huntington sees immigrants, which reject assimilation, as a challenge to western culture because they "...and continue to adhere to and to propagate the values, customs, and cultures of their home societies." (Huntington, 1996, pp. 304-305). In the United States, this phenomenon is most notable among the Hispanics, and in Europe among the Muslims. If this trend continues, Huntington warns, the United States will become a 'cleft country'.¹⁸

There are striking similarities between Huntington's view on immigrants and the old colonial view on immigrants. According to the wife of the second president of the United States, Abigail Adams, "The grand cause of all our present difficulties may be traced...to so many hordes of Foreigners immigrating to America." (Campbell, 1998, p. 128). This attitude, with most certainty, represented the leading social elite in Colonial America.

The other challenge within western societies, according to Huntington, comes from multiculturalists. A small but influential number of intellectuals and publicists, Huntington notes, have in the late twentieth century criticized components of American identity. "In the name of multiculturalism they have attacked the identification of the United States with the Western civilization, denied the existence of a common American culture, and promoted racial, ethnic and other subnational cultural identities and groupings." (Huntington, 1996, p. 305). Multiculturalism, according to Huntington is a threat to the unity of the nation because they promote/encourage diversity, and diversity in Huntington's mind would only lead to a

¹⁸ A 'cleft country', according to Huntington, is a country where deep divisions emerge, which could lead to 'massive violence or threaten the country's existence'. These consequences are due to the fact that large groups belonging to different civilizations are present in one country.

"schizophrenic torn country". "A multicivilizational United States will not only be the United States; it will be the United Nations" (Huntington, 1996, p. 306). Multiculturalists are also a threat because they question the West's exceptionalist myths and its limited application of the principles of liberty and equality.

Quoting Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Huntington states that, they (multiculturalists) are "...very often ethnocentric separatists who see little in the Western heritage other than Western crimes." Their "...mood is one of divesting Americans of the sinful European inheritance and seeking redemptive infusions from non-Western cultures." (Huntington, 1996, p. 305). Just as Campbell points out that the way the Puritan society in America treated its surroundings reflects the fragility of their identity, Huntington's anti-multiculturalism can also be interpreted along the same lines. For Huntington the concept of a multicultural U.S. society is threatening to both the national narrative that depends on a stability of values and to the individuals constituting in such a system. It is the multiplicity of valuation in multiculturalism that is the most provocative. Just as the 'Founding Fathers' worried that America would face an uncertain future if the American 'identity' was challenged by the growing domestic dissent, so does Huntington worry that America will become a 'torn country', if the multicultural trend is not stopped.

Highlighting the contrast between the leaders of the United States today and those of their Founding Fathers, Huntington believes that the Clinton administration was making a mistake. In the 1990's diversity was permitted and promoted, Huntington does not agree that this is the appropriate solution to attain unity among the peoples of the United States. Agreeing with the Founding Fathers, diversity is seen as a reality and as a problem. Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, representing the Continental Congress, sought to promote national unity, hence the motto; *e pluribus unum* (of many, one).

In the end then, the struggle between 'the West and the Rest', really begins on the home front. Huntington's preoccupation with immigrants causing the United States to become a 'cleft country' and multiculturalists that promote the de-westernization of the United States can be seen as evidence of Huntington's fight to re-discipline the American Self.

Conclusion

Campbell with his theory has challenged our ideas about the underlying principle determinants of international politics. As a result, his theory therefore presents a critical and provoking picture, not only of American foreign policy, but of foreign policy generally.

Can Campbell's theory challenge the underlying fundamental principles that Huntington's theory is built upon? Campbell argues that the American identity is historically constructed and reconstructed through continuous disciplinary discourses of danger. Can Huntington's theory be regarded as a part of this tradition of disciplinary discourses of danger? In other words, is Huntington's civilizational geopolitical theory really a form of identity politics?

As I have mentioned earlier in my thesis, Huntington's theory is a reaction to the vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union. With this 'unpredicted' event the primary dangerous Other was gone. In line with Campbell's theory, Huntington's theory therefore came at a 'convenient' time, when there was a 'crisis' in regards to the American identity. With his theory Huntington has managed to provide a 'new' dangerous 'Other' that has become a major basis for the present American foreign policy.

In line with Campbell's analysis, Huntington's new 'Other', helps to clearly define the demarcations between the 'Self' and the 'Other', that is to identify different groups as un-American and dangerous, in contrast to the idealized 'imagined' Self. It is Huntington's strict definition of the American identity, which enables him to point to different groups and label them as 'unamerican' and as threats to the established identity. By doing this he preserves the traditional elitist view of the American identity. As Campbell argues, the notion that there is a need to protect the American identity from 'unamerican' forces, can rather be regarded as a clear sign that the established definition of the American identity is going through a crisis or change.

Campbell's description of how the threat of the 'Other' was exaggerated among older political texts, is also true of Huntington. In apocalyptic terms, Huntington exclaims:

If...Americans cease to adhere to their liberal democratic and European-rooted political ideology, the United States as we have known it will cease to exist and it will follow the other ideologically defined superpower onto the ash heap of history (Huntington, 1993b).

Just as the exaggeration of the difference and danger of the 'Other' in the Cold War geopolitics helped to secure and reinforce a set of 'geographical identities' (the West, the Soviet Union and the United States), while also serving to discipline domestic social and cultural differences within these spaces, Huntington geo-cultural civilizational theory serves the same purpose today. With the help of his theory, the dangerous 'Other' is once again clearly defined and labeled in this uncertain postmodern globalized world and thereby the American 'identity' disciplined.

In the end then, regarding Huntington's theory through the prism of Campbell's analysis, helps us understand Huntington's theory differently. Instead of viewing his theory as representing a paradigm within international relations, rather his theory should be viewed as continuing a discourse of danger within American foreign policy. In other words, Huntington helps to (re)produce and discipline the American identity and renew the society of security within the West. In other words, his theory has more to do with making global politics a clash of civilizations, rather than being about a clash of civilizations.

Campbell's Theoretical Premise Versus Huntington's Theoretical Premise

Before leaving Campbell's theory, I would like to shortly discuss Campbell's theoretical premise in relation to Huntington's, because it will add another dimension to my analysis of Huntington's theory.

The theories of Huntington and Campbell are complete opposites in a major regard. While Huntington, depoliticizes culture in order to map out a simple geopolitical map in which politicians can guide their politics, Campbell politicizes culture in order to uncover the real/material political reasons behind the construction of these geopolitical maps.

If we look closer at Campbell's theoretical premise he relates his own theoretical framework in opposition to the theoretical discourse that is common among "...practitioners of the discipline of international relations." (Campbell, 1998, p. 4). His argument, he says, "...is part of an emerging dissent literature in international relations that draws sustenance from a series of modern thinkers who have focused on historically specific modes of discourse rather than the supposedly independent realms of subjects and objects." (Campbell, 1998, pp. 4-5).

Contrary to epistemic realism¹⁹, which explains events and actions with material causes, Campbell focuses instead on "...considering the manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another." (Campbell, 1998, p. 4). While epistemic realism sanctions the analytic forms of 'narrativizing historiography'²⁰ and 'logic of explanation'²¹, Campbell employs "...a mode of historical representation that self-consciously adopts a perspective" and embraces "...a logic of interpretation that acknowledges the improbability of cataloging, calculating, and specifying the 'real causes'". (Campbell, 1998, p. 4). In this way Campbell's theory questions the "...traditions of international relations and their claims of adequacy to reality" but instead focuses "...on the way the world has been made historically possible". (Campbell, 1998, p. 5).

Campbell understands his analysis neither as a purely theoretical nor as a purely historical mode, rather he sees his analysis in terms of 'a history of the present'. This interpretative 'attitude', Campbell has taken from Michel Foucault. (Even though Foucault's ideas are the inspiration, I will only be focusing on Campbell's interpretation.) According to Campbell, a 'history of the present' is a mode of analysis, which seeks to trace how rituals of power arise, take shape, gain importance, and effect politics (Campbell, 1998, p. 6). "In short, this mode of analysis asks how certain terms and concepts have historically functioned within discourse." (Campbell, 1998, p. 6).

I would briefly like to look a little bit at the criticism Campbell's theory has received because this is relevant not only in regards to Huntington's theory, but also with regards to my own theoretical basis.

¹⁹ Epistemic realism: the world comprises objects whose existence is independent of ideas and beliefs about them.

²⁰ Narrativizing historiography: in which things have a self-evident quality that allows them to speak for themselves.

Most of Campbell's critics praise his general theoretical premise, and believe that his theoretical framework would serve as a fruitful guide for similar future studies. However, Campbell has received criticism because his presentation of the American identity is too homogenized. Campbell mostly operates with the 'official' representations of American identity and how these representations are a part of an ongoing 'fight' to preserve the American traditional identity, but Campbell reflects or shows very little of the other half of the 'fight', the 'unofficial' part. There is a long tradition in America of opposition and dissent against the elite bureaucracy, and it is this tradition that is lost in Campbell's theory.

In one way Campbell's neglect of the 'unofficial' influence of the American identity, helps to establish 'continuity' of the identity, and neglect the many 'discontinuities' that can be expected when applying his theoretical framework.

I will not go further into this discussion because it is not too relevant when it comes to Huntington's theory because Huntington's theory without a doubt represents the 'official' side in the 'fight' over the definition of the American identity. Therefore, the criticism that Campbell has received is not too relevant when it comes to seeing Huntington's theory through Campbell's eyes. In one significant way, Campbell's theory itself represents the 'discontinuity' of American identity that his critics miss and that Huntington is 'fighting' against.

The argument that 'discontinuity' in a certain discourse is lost because too much focus is placed on showing 'continuity' despite the changing material historical conditions can however be directed towards my own presentation of Huntington's theory. In my eagerness to place/understand Huntington's theory as a part of a long western geopolitical tradition, it is easy to 'ignore' the 'discontinuities' that do not correspond well with my argument.

‘Writing Security’, is an interesting and well delivered interpretation of American foreign policy. Campbell’s postmodern presentation, even though it is supposed to be a genealogy, not a history, is presented in a relatively traditional form. His arguments are convincing and are backed up with evidence, which weighs heavily. He wants to show how the constant

²¹ Logic of explanation: in which the purpose of analysis is to identify those self-evident things and material causes so that actors can accommodate themselves to the realm of necessity they engender.

struggle to secure an American identity through history has not changed that much. The structural logic and the different modes of representation have continued to be applied in the disparate periods.

Campbell's theory, despite the criticism, is of great interest value because of his critical study of identity and foreign policy. His theory, as we have seen has worked well as a different theoretical framework in which Huntington's theory can be understood.

Part 4: Huntington's Theory and His Theoretical Realism

4.1 Huntington's theory versus Huntington's realism

In the last chapter I claimed that Huntington's theory tells us more about his engagement in U.S. domestic and foreign policy debate than about a coming 'clash of civilizations'. There is another interesting perspective that will add further support to this claim.

As mentioned in the introduction, Huntington's response in the many interviews and articles after 11th of September, does not correspond well with the ideas he presents in his 'Clash theory'. This is an interesting contradiction, which I would like to examine further.

Huntington did not see the 11th of September as confirmation of his theory. On the contrary, in keeping with theoretical realism he explains that the incident has political and material reasons.²² In his 'Clash theory', however, realism is not strongly represented. As a realist, Huntington should have given a lot more attention to real material interests and power politics of nations, instead of explaining his 'new world order' almost entirely in cultural and civilizational terms.

Why is there clearly a contradiction between how Huntington explains conflicts in his 'Clash theory' and how he explains the events of 11th of September? How relevant is this when it comes to understanding his theory?

I believe that the inconsistency between Huntington's theoretical position in his 'Clash of Civilizations theory' and the theoretical position he otherwise can be identified with can be explained by viewing his theory rather as a political piece of work than an academic theory. Huntington's real purpose with the 'Clash of Civilizations theory' has to be reexamined.

As I indicated in the two previous chapters (3.1: 'Huntington's Theory: A Reaction to Postmodernity?' and 3.2: 'Huntington's Theory: A Discourse of Danger?') it seems that Huntington is not really concerned with the threat from the Muslim 'Other' at all. His real worry is rather the intellectual and political clash that he sees threatening within the United

²² See introduction.

States, and not the coming clash between different civilizations. He states that, "If Americans cease to adhere to their liberal democratic and European-rooted political ideology, the United States as we have known it will cease to exist and will follow the other ideologically defined superpower onto the ash heap of history." (Huntington, 1993b). Thus he is really concerned with a clash of civilizations at home. Therefore, as a true realist, Huntington tries to conger up a fictitious clash of civilizations abroad to "...galvanize America into a homogenous cultural bloc" (Aysha, 2003). Huntington knows, as did Machiavelli, how significant an outside threat, whether fictitious or not, can be to the sense of national unity within a population. His thesis therefore, could rather be perceived as a political statement aimed at influencing the domestic political discourse, instead of being understood as a new international relations theory.

Huntington's theoretical position

To characterize Huntington's theoretical position, that is, the school of international relations to which he belongs, is not as simple as with other authors.

Most of Huntington's academic work is found within the subject of international relations, and his intellectual approach falls in general within the theoretical realm of the realist school. There is also a certain category of 'realists' in his political and social connections. He is associated with the so called "primacy" school of foreign policy thought, where Zbigniew Brezezinski and Henry Kissinger belong. His description of himself as a "child of Reinhold Niebuhr" is an attempt to classify him, even more closely with classical realism.

Within the school of international relations, realism, can be characterized as

...the theory that takes the nation-state as the primary unit of international relations, seeing the relations between states as inherently anarchic and zero-sum in nature. Most importantly, realism assumes that the direction a country takes in its foreign policy is driven primarily by concerns of national security, meaning that alliances and groupings of states are fundamentally driven by power concerns, shared interests, and/or common threats (Aysha, 2003).

Another significant aspect of Huntington's theoretical position, is his focus on the conduct of the leaders of states. According to classical realism, state leaders should conduct themselves according to the doctrine of *raison d'état*, or reason of state. The primary principle of this doctrine is that

...the state, which is identified as the key actor in international politics, must pursue power, and it is the duty of the statesperson to calculate rationally the most appropriate steps that should be taken so as to perpetuate the life of the state in a hostile and threatening environment (Baylis, Smith, 2001, p. 142).

As we shall see this theoretical position is significant when it comes to classifying his theory within the tradition of 'Advice to the Prince literature'.

The Role of the American Creed

As I mentioned before, I believe Huntington's real concern is with the weakening of the cohesion of the state. As shown in the previous chapter, Huntington has directed his attention to several different factors, which he sees as having a degrading effect on the sense of national unity among Americans.

America, according to Huntington is in a unique situation, compared to other nations. The American collective 'we', according to Huntington, is premised on a set of political values, set out in the Declaration of Independence. According to Huntington, these values, which were later labeled as the 'American Creed' by Gunnar Myrdal, are not enough to maintain a stable national unity.

Huntington, like the Founding Fathers, as we have seen, is preoccupied with the America having a cultural identity because, he explains; "In an era in which peoples everywhere define themselves in cultural terms what place is there for a society without a cultural core and defined only by a political creed?" (Huntington, 1996, p. 306).

Turner explains why cultural identity is essential for national unity;

"The nation-state typically arose on the back of the idea of ethnic coherence; this is why we use the word 'nation' in describing the modern state as a 'nation-state'. It is based upon the assumption that a unified polity has to have a unified ethnic base and indeed the nineteenth-century nation-states had a strong policy of unification and integration which required the subordination of local dialect, regional culture and domestic diversity."... "Ethnic diversification and multicultural politics challenge the idea of the political grand narrative of national democracy, national coherence and national unification." (Turner, 1994, p. 201).

Following this reasoning, the need for 'national unity' is even more pronounced in the case of America because of the vast difference in cultural background of American citizens.

For this reason, Huntington is very much against multicultural politics; they challenge the idea of a 'grand narrative' of a single homogenous identity. Huntington, as we know, advocates strongly the protection of the American national identity by claiming that if other non-western cultural influences are allowed to be incorporated into the American identity, this would in fact lead to the fall of the Western civilization.

Like the Founding Fathers, Huntington defines the Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, English culture as the cultural legacy in which the American national identity was based and should continue to be based upon.

Huntington warns that while in the past, minorities did everything to join the mainstream national culture, today, minorities with the help from the liberal politics of multiculturalism are promoting their culture of origin. The result is a dilution of European culture. According to Huntington the problem is thus not immigration itself, but rather deciding to which culture immigrants should assimilate into.

Diluting the European cultural heritage from the American national identity could easily have a tremendous effect on US foreign policy. Huntington fears that a de-westernization of the US would mean a reorientation of its foreign policy towards another continent than Europe, possibly South America or Asia.

He believes that promoting multiculturalism within the US, is domesticating foreign policy. The consequences of this would mean that foreign policy would no longer promote national

interests. Politicians would instead be conducting a foreign policy to please ethnic voters and various lobby groups.

In Huntington's mind this would have a devastating consequence on America and eventually western civilization. His advice, in order to counteract this development, amongst many things, is to promote a renewal of Atlanticism. This he believes is essential in order to maintain a strong US:

If North America and Europe renew their moral life, build on their cultural commonality, and develop close forms of economic and political integration to supplement their security collaboration in NATO, they could generate a third Euroamerican phase of Western economic affluence and political influence. Meaningful political integration would in some measure counter the relative decline in the West's share of the world's people, economic product, and military capabilities and revive the power of the West in the eyes of the leaders of other civilizations (Huntington, 1996, p. 308).

Just as multiculturalism is weakening the American national unity and having a negative effect on American foreign policy, so is the belief in and promotion of western Universalism. As discussed earlier, the obvious reason for concern is the negative reaction it evokes among non-western cultures. 'Western Universalism', or 'globalization', however, is a threat not only because it evokes negative reactions among non-westerners, but because it directly undermines the power of the state and distorts the states real national interests. Huntington is thus concerned that 'economic globalism' and multiculturalism is having a negative effect on America's 'national unity' and 'cultural integrity'. He is concerned that "...economic globalization is creating a growing gap between denationalized elites and nationalist publics" (Huntington, 1999-2000) in the United States. Huntington is afraid of the 'commercialism' trend, which places commercial interests over 'strategic' and 'political' considerations.

This weakening effect of the state due to global capitalism that Huntington is afraid of, is also pointed out in Bamyeh, in his book; *The Ends of Globalization*. Due to an increasing globalized economy, the state today "...has no logical plan, guide, metanarrative, or long-term vision for the logical cosmos to which it would wed such inherited resourcefulness." (Bamyeh, 2000). In other words Huntington is battling a postmodern condition, which presumably is bringing about the end of the state and also the end of the meta-narrative. He is

afraid that "...denationalized elites have helped to elevate economic interests to the top of the agenda of U.S. foreign policy." (Aysha, 2003).

Though Huntington is a realist with a realist agenda, his theory, on the other hand, cannot be classified as an essentially realist theory! It cannot be viewed as a contribution to realist theory in international relations, let alone a paradigm shift. It is rather a political piece of work, aimed at countering a political development within the US that Huntington perceives as negative to the maintenance of US hegemony.

Huntington sees 'the real clash' (Huntington, 1996, p. 307) going on within the American segment of western civilization and not between civilizations. In order to counteract this development, which in Huntington's mind will lead to the downfall of western civilization, an external threat is needed. Thus Huntington suggests that presenting a cultural 'evil' 'Other' will not only help undermine the politics of multiculturalism, but also, help shake America's business elites out of their liberal notion of world order and promote a realist vision that would be much more beneficial to American national unity.

Thus it seems that the 'Other' is not really the problem at all, but is created in order to counteract 'a domestic situation' that Huntington sees as a threat to the unity of his nation.

The question might be raised, why he serves the public with his ideological black and white, civilizational world order, which essentially goes against his own theoretical realist position?

Distinct Presuppositions and Orientations Behind American Foreign Policy

The reason why Huntington presents his theory as realism clothed in the same Cold War theoretical ideological, black and white world order, is that Americans do not like realism. The way to sell foreign policy to Americans is therefore through ideological rhetoric, where good and evil are central concepts.

There is thus a gap between public rhetoric and what actually is decided among elites behind closed doors. Professor, John J. Mearsheimer at the University of Chicago, is of the opinion

that Americans in general adhere to the liberal school in international relations, because it is the paradigm within IR that closest reflects their basic values. These basic values are described as deep-seated sense of optimism and moralism. Their optimism is reflected in international politics in that they believe that with “time and effort, reasonable individuals can cooperate to solve important social problems.” (Mearsheimer, 2002, pp. 24-28). Their moralism can also be detected in international politics. As Martin Lipset: “Americans are utopian moralists who press hard to institutionalise virtue, to destroy evil people, and eliminate wicked institutions and practices.”²³

The Realist school of international politics has a more difficult time appealing to the American mind. Thus most Americans would “recoil” at the Realist interpretation of the Cold War. A realist interpretation would understand the conflict in terms of balance of power, meaning the two superpowers had the same agenda, that of maximizing it’s own relative power. The realist would therefore not characterize the one nation as being motivated by good intentions, while the other was not. Americans dislike 'realpolitik' because it does not distinguish between good and bad states. To an American, a good state is a liberal democracy with a solid market economy. To an American the spread of liberal democracy and market economy will help bring about stability and world peace. This is why, Mearsheimer says, that with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the “evil empire”, “many Americans (and Europeans) concluded that democracy would spread across the globe and that world peace would soon break out.” (Mearsheimer, 2002, pp. 24-28). This meant according to Francis Fukuyama that we were witnessing "the end of History" (Fukuyama, 1992).

No matter how much the media or the academics promote liberal thinking in international politics however, 'realpolitik' is in essence the backbone of American foreign policy.

Many realists, among them the prominent realist George Kennan, have criticized American foreign policy to be too much influenced by the liberal school. Mearsheimer, however, believes that Kennan is mistaken, the United States does not practice what it preaches, on the contrary, it “speaks one way and acts another” (Mearsheimer, 2002, pp. 24-28). This tendency in American foreign policy has been around for a long time. Quoting E.H. Carr, he points out that the English-speaking peoples have been “masters in the art of concealing their selfish

²³ Quoted in: Mearsheimer, 2002, pp. 24-28.

national interests in the guise of the general good,” and that “this kind of hypocrisy is a special and characteristic peculiarity of the Anglo-Saxon mind.” (Mearsheimer, 2002, pp. 24-28).

If this is the case, that there is a gap between rhetoric and reality in American foreign policy, a gap that usually goes unnoticed in the United States. Americans’ belief in liberalism as a way of understanding their surroundings downplays the realist point of view. Mearsheimer believes that the contradiction between rhetoric and policy is lost to most Americans because they “readily accept these rationalizations because liberalism is so deeply rooted in their culture. As a result, they find it easy to believe that they are acting according to cherished principles, rather than cold and calculated power considerations.” (Mearsheimer, 2002, pp. 24-28). Therefore, actions even if they are motivated by realist considerations, must be explained with liberal rhetoric. For instance in some situations, like World War II and the Cold War, Mearsheimer points out that realist dictates coincide with the dictates of liberalism. Both wars were largely fought for realist reasons, but at the same time it was not difficult to convince the public that the wars were being fought for ideological reasons. This was because there was no conflict between the pursuit of power and the pursuit of principle. “under these circumstances, realist policies can be justified with liberal rhetoric without having to discuss the underlying power realities.” (Mearsheimer, 2002, pp. 24-28).

However, when a situation arises where it is clear that the United States is not acting along the lines of liberal principles, “spin doctors” appear. By this, Mearsheimer means that with enough political propaganda one is able to tell a story which accords with liberal ideals. One example of this is how the U.S. government managed to clean up the image of the Soviet Union and Stalin in 1941. This was important, in that they joined forces against the Third Reich. With a massive public relations campaign, the Americans now thought they were fighting alongside a proto-democracy and “Uncle Joe”.

How then is Huntington's theory contributing to selling American foreign policy, in the new Post Cold War world using traditional American foreign policy rhetoric?

Huntington's 'Clash theory' is not based on theoretical liberalism, nor is it, as I have shown, true to realism either. The question is, whether Huntington can be viewed as a 'spin doctor'

who has provided the US government with a (familiar geopolitical) contextual framework for its policies.

I believe that his 'civilizational' world order has done exactly that. It provides a canvas, which the government can use as a legitimate backdrop and where it is easy to incorporate ideological liberal explanations for power politics.

Therefore, viewing Huntington's theory in relation to Mearsheimer's analysis provides an interesting perspective of the Huntington puzzle. When observing the political rhetoric that is coming out of the White House after "9/11", it is not difficult to notice the close connection between Huntington's civilizational new world order and the use of ideological liberal explanations concerning US policies. Here, President Bush's State of the Union Speech, in 2003, provides a good example:

This threat is new; America's duty is familiar. Throughout the 20th century, small groups of men seized control of great nations, built armies and arsenals, and set out to dominate the weak and intimidate the world. In each case, their ambitions of cruelty and murder had no limit. In each case, the ambitions of Hitlerism, militarism and communism were defeated by the will of free peoples, by the strength of great alliances and by the might of the United States of America.

Now, in this century, the ideology of power and domination has appeared again, and seeks to gain the ultimate weapons of terror. Once again this nation and all our friends are all that stand between a world at peace and a world of chaos and constant alarm. Once again we are called to defend the safety of our people and the hopes of all mankind. And we accept this responsibility (Bush, 2003).²⁴

Huntington's close ties to the foreign policy establishment in Washington, adds further weight to the claim that his theory has helped to persuade the American public that the US governments intentions and involvements towards the new 'Other' is necessary.

However, despite the many close connections that can be found between today's American foreign policy and Huntington's theory, I do believe that the way the theory is being interpreted and used, is not in accordance with what the author had in mind/ or intended.

²⁴ President George Bush's State of the Union Address, January 29, 2003.

Theories tend to take on a life of their own. As Quentin Skinner points out, it is possible when discussing how to analyse a text, "...to distinguish between the political point a text serves in its political context and the author's political point in writing it." (Tully, 1988, p.12). Because as Skinner argues, "It does not necessarily follow from a text serving to make a political point in its practical context that this was what the author was doing in writing it." (Tully, 1988, pp. 12). For instance, "*The Prince* serves to legitimate a vicious prince, it does not necessarily follow that this was Machiavelli's political point in writing it." (Tully, 1988, p.12).

It seems that in international politics, a typical twist of fate is being played out once again. Just as George Kennan's "Mr. X" article was interpreted and used in favour of policies conducted by the government, despite Kennan's claims that his ideas had been misunderstood, in a similar fashion it is possible to view Huntington's theory.

I believe that the unforeseen events of the 11th of September resulted in a direction of American foreign policy by the Bush administration, that Huntington disagrees with and warns against in his theory. Huntington's reaction to the events of the 11th of September supports this view. As mentioned before, Huntington, of all people, advocates strongly that the 11th of September was not a real 'clash of civilizations'. This might appear surprising, but after having studied his theory both in a historical geopolitical context and a contemporary political context, a different understanding of his intentions with his theory surfaces. It is different from the mainstream interpretation and therefore results in a different conclusion.

Of course, there is no way getting around the fact that his theory has contributed to giving legitimacy to the foreign policy conducted by the Bush administration towards the Muslim world. It could be argued that Huntington should have foreseen that his theory could be used in this way. Even if this is the way many have interpreted his theory, I do not think this was what Huntington had in mind.

Huntington's theory was meant to establish a stronger sense of national unity and influence American foreign policy to be conducted on behalf of 'true' realist national interests, and not on behalf of the interests of commercial or minority groups. This would explain his reactions to and explanations of the 11th of September.

Huntington does not label today's grave situation in the Middle East as a 'clash of civilizations', but rather as a situation that is due to clash of material and political interests. Muslim reaction to American commercial, military and political involvement in the Middle East over the last two decades is part of this picture.

Huntington believes that American involvement in the Middle East does not serve vital American national interests. On the contrary, American involvement on behalf of the interests of commercial elites and minority groups could easily escalate an already tense situation into a 'real' clash of civilizations. Therefore, it is for this reason that Huntington cannot be seen advocating a war with Iraq. On the contrary, Huntington would see this move taken by the Bush administration, as devastatingly wrong. As he indicates in a *Newsweek* article; "The longer and the more intensely the United States and its allies use military force against their opponents, the more widespread and intense will be the Muslim reaction." (Huntington, 2002).

In the same article, he goes on to argue that:

The age of Muslim wars will end when its causes change or are changed. With the succession of generations, the intensity of Islamic consciousness may decline, as it clearly has in Iran. The resentment and hostility of Muslims toward the West could be reduced by changes in U.S. policies toward Israel. In the longer run, however, improvements in the social, economic and political conditions in Muslim countries would be necessary. Governments that fail to meet the basic welfare and economic needs of their peoples and suppress their liberties generate violent opposition to themselves and to Western governments that support them (Huntington, 2002).

In conclusion then, when viewing Huntington's theory in relation to his earlier and later works, it is possible to claim that his intentions, even though this did not happen, were to guide American foreign policy in a direction which would avoid a war of civilizations.

4.2 Conclusion

Having examined Huntington's theory within a geopolitical historical perspective as well as a contemporary political perspective, it seems clear that Huntington has not contributed a new paradigm as he claims, but rather placed new political issues into an old theoretical framework.

As a student of the history of ideas, I have approached Huntington's theory from a different angle than most critics, who have asked whether his theory is correct or not. Instead I have asked what place does his theory occupy in our western conceptual history.

By examining Huntington's theory within geopolitical history, we saw that his theory can be placed well within a western geopolitical tradition. When deconstructing his theory, it became apparent that older geopolitical concepts and ideas make up the conceptual framework of the theory. Like his predecessors, Huntington conveys his all-encompassing global vision, not as a subjective view from somewhere, but as an objective view from nowhere. Presented in this way his theory is conveyed as a 'scientific' perspective of the world as a structured 'whole', where different parts are only understood in relation to the whole.

As in other older geopolitical theories, we saw that the concept of the 'Other' was central in Huntington's theory. Even though the material and historical conditions changed with time, the role of the 'Other' has more or less remained the same within our western geopolitical discourse.

After having examined Huntington's theory within geopolitical history it was argued that his theory could not be classified as a new paradigm because it did not represent a 'revolution' in the field of international politics. His theory has not overthrown and replaced a framework in which his theory would be incompatible. On the contrary, his theory continues a western geopolitical tradition.

To understand Huntington's theory fully, it was also necessary to analyse it within its contemporary social and political context. By examining how Huntington views the effects of our globalized world, it became apparent that his theory could be viewed as a reaction to the

conditions of our 'postmodern' world. Huntington's real concern therefore is with the degenerating effect this new globalized world order has on the American identity.

By examining the development of the American identity, we saw how the American 'Self' could be understood as historically constructed and reconstructed through the continuous disciplinary discourses of danger. In other words, it is possible to understand Huntington's geo-civilizational theory as a form of identity politics. Providing a dangerous 'Other', either fictitious or real, helps to (re)produce and discipline the American 'Self'. This is especially important in America where domestic and foreign policy are so closely linked.

Therefore, Huntington's real objective with a civilizational world order theory is his concern with a domestic situation. Huntington is afraid that the political unity and cultural homogeneity in his country is threatened. He sees the traditional Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, English cultural inheritance of the American identity being undermined by various groups within the United States. In order to counter this development, a foreign common threat would help to quell dissidence and enforce a stronger sense of community. A domestic cultural problem needs a foreign cultural threat. With his new geo-civilizational world order therefore, Huntington has provided a cultural 'Other' for the American political scene as a substitute for the Cold War ideological 'Other'.

The contradiction that became especially apparent after '9/11', between Huntington's theory and his theoretical realism, provided further support to the conclusion that his theory could be understood as a political piece of work. The theory's aim was to influence a stronger sense of unity, thereby also influencing American foreign policy to be conducted on behalf of 'true' realist national interests. Huntington criticizes the political elites in his country because he sees that they are using foreign policy in order to create domestic support among its ethnic voters and lobby groups. This has resulted in tremendous incoherence in American foreign policy.

The foreign policy advice that Huntington advocates is in direct opposition to the policy that is being conducted by the Bush-administration. Huntington promotes a stronger Atlantic bond (not only with the 'new' Europe) and views negatively the growing American involvement in East Asia and the Middle East.

In the end then, Huntington's theory has a side to it that most critics have neglected, namely the domestic side. A cultural battle at home is therefore solved by a civilizational clash abroad.

I believe that Huntington's theory is significant because viewed differently, the theory tells us more about 'Us' than it does about a coming clash of civilizations. Huntington's theory represents a vital part of the present western political discourse. The theory has contributed and reflects the renaissance of concepts such as religion, culture, and civilizations, in leading political discourses. Today, these concepts are an essential part of how we explain present global conflicts. This would not have been readily accepted just a few years ago. In other words, Huntington's theory reveals significant aspects of our western conceptual understanding of our surroundings.

Lastly, I would like to raise a question, which goes beyond the scope of the issues examined in this thesis. Has Huntington's theory contributed to undermining central global political issues because in a 'civilizational' world order they would not be labeled correctly? In keeping with Huntington's 'civilizational' world order, our perspective and understanding of global conflicts is focused on an East-West continuum. If we turned our geopolitical map a 90 degrees, changing our focus to a North-South continuum, would our understanding of global political conflicts be different? Would we regard other global political issues as more dire than the ones we do today? Many western leaders have labeled 'terrorism' as the most pressing existential problem in our world today. But is this really a global problem or is it just a western problem? With a different geopolitical map would not starvation, poverty, war and global environmental issues be regarded as more existential? By turning our geopolitical map 90 degrees, would this return central concepts such as 'power' and 'interests' back as the primary movers of nations in our post-Cold War world?

International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim. Statesmen and peoples may ultimately seek freedom, security, prosperity, or power itself. They may define their goals in terms of a religious, philosophic, economic, or social ideal. They may hope that this ideal will materialize through its own inner force, through divine intervention, or through the natural development of human affairs. But whenever they strive to realize their goal by means of international politics, they do so by striving for power.

(Hans Morganthau, 1948)

Summary

This thesis investigates one of the most interesting and debated recent theories in the field of international relations, namely the one Harvard-professor Samuel P. Huntington, "*The Clash of Civilizations*", put forward in an article in the Journal of Foreign Affairs in 1993.

Huntington states that civilizational and cultural factors, not economics or ideologies, will be the principle reason why conflicts occur in our Post Cold War world. Huntington provoked many by claiming that "In this new world, local politics is the politics of ethnicity; global politics is the politics of civilizations. The rivalry of the superpowers is replaced by the clash of civilizations." The article evoked an enormous response world-wide. According to the editor of Foreign Affairs, it stirred up more discussion than any other article since the 1940's.

In contrast to the prevailing debate and criticisms of Huntington's theory, which mainly deals with Huntington's claim that the rivalry of the superpowers is replaced by the clash of civilizations, my aim has been to question the conceptual construction of his theory. Central to the discussion has been to analyze Huntington's theory within a geopolitical historical context and a contemporary political context.

In the preface of the book (*The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*) that followed the article, Huntington says that his theory "...aspires to present a framework, a paradigm, for viewing global politics that will be meaningful to scholars and useful to policymakers." That his theory represents a paradigm within the field of international relations is a bold claim to make, even for a Harvard professor. This thesis dismisses his claim on the basis that the theory does nothing but continue a long, western geopolitical tradition. In other words, his theory has rather placed new political issues into an old theoretical framework.

Having deconstructed Huntington's theory, the theory's objective is also questioned; is his theory really about a clash of civilizations? Is it possible to understand Huntington's 'civilizational' world order theory as some form of identity politics? Huntington is afraid that the political unity and cultural homogeneity in his country is threatened. He sees the traditional Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, English cultural inheritance of the American identity being undermined by various groups within the United States. A foreign common threat would help quell dissidence and enforce a stronger sense of community. Therefore a domestic cultural problem needs a foreign cultural threat. In this light, Huntington, like many before him, provides a new dangerous 'Other', which helps to discipline the American 'Self'. This new 'Other' is defined along cultural terms as opposed to ideological terms, which was the case during the cold war.

In the end, Huntington's theory is significant because it represents a vital part of our present western mental conceptual framework. It has contributed to the renaissance of concepts such as religion, culture and civilizations in today's leading political discourse. In other words, Huntington's theory tells us more about American domestic and foreign policy than it does about a coming clash of civilizations.

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